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DESCR I PTI ON
Revision A changes have been incorporated into the basic
document to make it complete.
Section 2, TEST OBJECTIVES
ADDED: BL-I The insulation shall ensure that system
performance and structural integrity is
maintained during the assembly process and
operation. (3.2.1.8.1.1.c)
Section 4, CEI SPECIFICATIONS
ADDED: BL-I Col I, Qualification Objectives (CEI
Daraqraph number)
The insulation shall ensure that system
performance and structural integrity is
maintained during the assembly process and
operations. (3.2.1.8.1.I.c)
Col 2, Pass/Fail Criteria
System performance and structural integrity
during the assembly process and operation
shall not be compromised due to insulation.
Col 3, Results (Reference Section)
The insulation ensured that system
performance and structural integrity was
maintained during the assembly process and
operation. For a complete insulation
performance discussion, see TWR-17592,
Volume III, Revision A.
Paragraph 5.1, INTRODUCTION
ADDED: Additional instrumentation discussion can be found
in TWR-17592, Volume XII.
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Revision B changes have been incorporated into the basic
document to make it complete. Revisions are marked in
the text by a vertical bar in the right-hand margin.
Section 3, Executive Summary
ADDED TO: 3.1.4.]I Nozzle Composite Structures
Performance
Several strain plots in the nose inlet housing region
exhibited strain aberrations at about the 14-sec time
slice, most noticeable are the axial components at
Location 5, and the hoop and axial components at
Location 7, near the aft end of the nose inlet housing.
Other gages demonstrating responses of a lower magnitude
at this time slice hoop longwire gages at Locations J6
and J7 (Joint No. 2 proximity gages), J9 and J]O (Joint
No. 3), and Location 9. An investigation of the cause
of this event is currently being conducted. Despite
these unexpected changes in strain magnitude, peak
strains remained relatively low (less than
2,000 #in./in.), indicating metal part margins of
safety were well above zero.
REVISION
89265-12.2
FORM TC NO. 1R63
ooo INo. TWR- 17592 VOL
SEC IPAGE iV
m_ CORPORATION
SPA CE OPERATIONS
ABSTRACT
All inspection and instrumentation data indicate that the PV-I static test
firing conducted 18 Aug 1988 was successful. With the exception of the
intentionally flawed joints and static test modifications, PV-I was flight
configuration. Fail-safe flaws guaranteeing pressure to test the sealing
capability of primary O-rings were included in the aft field joint, case-to-
nozzle joint, and nozzle internal Joint 5. In this condition the only
pass/fail criteria was to prevent leakage of internal combustion gases From
the joint. The center field joint was flawed, guaranteeing pressure to the
capture feature O-ring. The igniter-to-case joint had two intentional blow-
holes in the putty to allow pressure to the edge separation flaw. The test
was conducted at ambient conditions, with the exception of the field joints
and case/nozzle joints which were maintained at a minimum of 75°F.
Ballistics performance values were within specification requirements.
The PV-] motor exhibited chamber pressure oscillations similar to previously
tested Space Shuttle redesigned solid rocket motors, particularly QM-7. The
first longitudinal mode oscillations experienced by PV-] were the strongest
ever measured in a Space Shuttle motor. Investigation into this observation
is being conducted. Joint insulation performed as designed with no evidence
of gas flow within unflawed forward field joints. The intentionally flawed
center and aft case field joint insulation performance was excellent. There
was no evidence of hot gas past the center field joint capture feature
O-ring, the case-to-nozzle joint primary O-ring, or the aft field joint pri-
mary O-ring. O-ring seals and barriers with assured pressure at the flaws
showed erosion and heat effect, but all sealed against passage of hot gases
with the exception of the aft Field joint capture Feature O-ring. There was
no evidence of erosion, heat effect, or blowby on any O-ring seals or
barriers at the unflawed joints. Nozzle performance was nominal with typical
erosion. Post-test examination revealed that the forward nose ring was of
the old high performance motor design configuration with the 150-deg ply
angle. An investigation is underway to determine how the old design forward
nose ring was mistakenly placed in an RSRM nose inlet assembly, although this
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had no bearing on test performance and no problems were encountered. All
nozzle components remained intact for post-test evaluation. Field joint
heaters maintained the temperature at the controlling resistance temperature
detector within the specified requirements during operation. The thrust
vector control system operated correctly. The water deluge system, CO2
quench, and other test equipment performed as planned during all required
test operations.
L
w
REVISION B o_.o. TWR-17592 I_L
SEC I _OE vi
-- 89265-3.4
__'_4_ CORPORA T/ON
SPACE OPERATIONS
= =
= =
Section
i
4
5
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................ ]
1.1
1.2
1.2.]
1.2.2
1.2.3
].2.4
1.2.5
1.2.6
TEST ARRANGEMENT AND FACILITIES .......... 1
TEST ITEM DESCRIPTION ............... I
Propellant/Liner/Inhibitor ............. 5
Insulation ..................... 5
Nozzle/TVC ..................... 8
Case/Seal s..................... 11
Ignition System .....
JPS/Weatherseal/Systems Tunnel l i i i i i i _ i i . 2121
OBJECTIVES ......................... 32
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................... 38
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.8
3.1.9
SUMMARY ...................... 38
Case Performance ................ 38
Case Internal Insulation Performance ....... 38
Seals Component/Leak Check Performance ..... 43
Nozzle Assembly Performance ........... 45
Igniter Performance ............... 65
JPS/Factory Joint Weatherseal Performance ..... 65
Systems Tunnel ................. 68
Instrumentation .............. 68
Ground Support Equipment ............ 68
3.1.10 Loads and Environments ............... 68
3.1.11 Ballistics/Mass Properties Performance ....... 68
3.1.12 Aero/Thermal ................... 72
3.1.13 Dynamics ...................... 77
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2.6
RECOMMENDATIONS ................. 87
Slag Prediction ................. 87
Chamber Pressure Oscillation ......... 87
Nozzle Composite Structure ............ 87
Motor Pressure Measurement (Aft Dome) ..... 87
Nozzle Instrumentation ............... 87
TASS Finite Element Model Results ......... 87
CEI SPECIFICATIONS .................... 88
INSTRUMENTATION ................... g7
INTRODUCTION .................... 97
OBJECTIVES ..................... 97
=
REVtSION B
89265-11.I
Doc_ TWR-17592 I_L
=c I_aE vii
_ CORPORATION
i
w
SPACE OPERATIONS
CONTENTS (Cont)
Section
6
7
8
9
Paqe
5.3 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS ........... 104
5.4 DISCUSSION ..................... 104
PHOTOGRAPHY ..................... 111
6.1 STILL PHOTOGRAPHY ................. I]1
6.2 MOTION PICTURES .................. 111
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT .................. 117
LOADS AND ENVIRONMENTS ................... 118
8.1 INTRODUCTION .................... I]8
8.2 OBJECTIVES ......... i ........... 118
8.3 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS ........ . . . 118
8.4 RESULTS/DISCUSSIONS ................ 118
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .................... 127
i
w
REVISION B
89265-11.2
ooc.o. TWR-17592 I_L
_c i _aE viii
COrPORA.ON
SPACE OPERATIONS
FIGURES
w
m
w
1.1-1
1.1-2
1.2-I
1.2-2
1.2.1-I
1.2.3-I
1.2.3-2
1.2.3-3
1.2.4-I
1.2.4-2
1.2.4-3
1.2.4-4
1.2.4-5
1.2.4-6
1.2.4-7
1.2.4-8
1.2.4-9
1.2.4-10
1.2.4-11
1.2.4-12
1.25-I
1.26-I
3.14.1-I
3.14.2-I
3.14.3-I
3.14.3-2
3.14.4-I
3.1.4.4-2
3.1.4.4-3
3.1.4.4-4
3.1.4.4-5
3.1.4.8-1
3.1.4.8.1-I
3.1.4.8.1-2
3.1.5-I
3.1.5-2
3.1.6.1-I
3.1.6.1-2
3.1.6.1-3
3.1.11-I
3.1.11-2
PV-I Static Test Motor During Assembly at T-24 Test Bay.. 2
PV-I Aft Skirt Conditioning ................ 3
PV-I Test Article Flaw Summary .............. 4
Overall View of PV-I Test Article ............. 6
RSRM Propellant Grain Design Configuration ........ 7
RSRM Nozzle Assembly ................... 9
Nozzle Internal Joint 5 Flaw ............. 10
Thrust Vector Actuation (TVA)'System ........... 12
Static Test Motor Configuration .............. 13
RSRM Case-to-Case Factory Joint .............. 14
RSRM Case-to-Case Field Joint ............... 15
Center Field Joint Flaw (Clevis) ............. 16
Aft Field Joint Flaw (Clevis) ............... 17
Aft Field Joint Flaw (Tang) ................ 18
Aft Field Joint O-ring Flaw .... ............ 19
Case-to-Nozzle Joint ................... 20
Case-to-Nozzle Insulation Bondline Defect ......... 22
Case-to-Nozzle Joint Flaw ................. 23
Nozzle Boss Induced Edge Separation ............ 24
Igniter-to-Forward Dome Edge Separation Locations ..... 25
RSRM Ignition System ................... 26
Simplified Joint Heater... 27
PV-I Polysulfide Separations . 46
PV-I Throat Assembly Bondline Separations ......... 51
Nose Cap Aft End Popped-Up Charred Material (204 deg).. 52
PV-I Nose Inlet Assembly Bondline Separations ....... 53
Cowl Aft End and Outer Boot Ring Forward End Popped-Up
Charred Material ..................... 54
PV-I Cowl/Outer Boot Ring (0 deg) ............. 56
PV-I Cowl/Outer Boot Ring (100 deg) ............ 57
PV-I Cowl/Outer Boot Ring (180 deg) ............ 58
PV-I Cowl/Outer Boot Ring (280 deg) ............ 59
PV-] Joint Flow Surface Gap Openings ........... 60
PV-] Blowpath in Aft Exit Cone Field Joint (224 deg) . . 61
PV-I Blowpath in Aft Exit Cone Field Joint (224 deg) . . . 62
RSRM Ignition System ................... 66
Safety and Arming Device Configuration .......... 67
Temperature at Controlling RTDs of Joints I, 2, and 3. . 69
Expanded Plot of Temperatures at Controlling RTDs for
Joints 1, 2, and 3 ................ 70
Minimum Differential Temperature of Joints I, 2, and 3 . . 71
PV-I Predicted and Measured Pressure at 79°F ....... 74
PV-I Predicted and Measured Thrust at 7g°F ........ 75
w REVISION B DOCNO.TWR-17592 I_L
_c I _oE ix
_ 89265-]1.3
_ CORPORATION
I
w
w
SPACE OPERATIONS
FIGURES (Cont)
3.].I]-3
3.1.13.]-1
3.].13.1-2
3.1.13.1-3
3.1.131-4
31.131-5
31.131-6
31.131-7
31.131-8
31.131-9
51-I
51-2
51-3
51-4
51-5
51-6
5.4-1
5.4-2
5.4-3
6.2-I
6.2-2
6.2-3
8.4-1
8.4-2
8.4-3
8.4-4
8.4-5
8.4-6
8.4-7
Paqe
Waterfall Plot of PV-I Dynamic Pressure, P016 ....... 76
A401 Time Response .................... 78
A402 Time Response .................... 79
A403 Time Response .............. .... 80
PV-I-A401PSD Compared With NASA Criteria ......... 81
PV-I-A402 PSD Compared With NASA Criteria ......... 82
PV-I-A403 PSD Compared With NASA Criteria ......... 83
Auto-Spectrum Waterfall Plot for A401 ........... 84
Auto-Spectrum Waterfall Plot for A402 ........... 85
Auto-Spectrum Waterfall Plot for A403 ........... 86
PV-I Case Instrumentation ................. 98
PV-I Head End Pressure Transducer Locations ........ 99
PV-] Joint Growth ..................... 100
PV-I Case-to-Nozzle Joint Instrumentation ......... I0I
PV-I Nozzle Instrumentation ................ 102
PV-I Aft Exit Cone Instrumentation ............ 103
Instrumentation at Flawed Field Joints ........ 107
Instrumentation at Flawed Nozzle-to-Case Joint ...... 108
Nozzle Internal Joint 5................. 109
Photography Coverage ................... 114
Photography Coverage ...............
Photography and Video'Coverage ........ i ..... 116115
Tangential Line Loads Versus Time ........... 119
Axial Line Loads Versus Time ............... 121
Strain Gage Locations ................... i22
Booster Local Coordinate System .............. 123
TVC Actuator Bracket ................... 124
Actuator Bracket Stress Versus Time ............ 125
Actuator Bracket Stress Versus Time ............ 126
m
u
w
=___
w
REVISION B DOCNO.TWR-17592 IVoL
SEC I PAOE X
89265-11.4
Wm
"_Z,_'._"-'(_#_ CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
Table
1.2.6-I
3.1.I.I-I
3.1.I.I-2
3.1.4.1-I
3.I.4.1-2
3.1.4.1-3
3.1.11-1
5.3-1
5.3-2
5.4-I
6.2-I
6.2-2
TABLES
PV-I Differences From First Flight .............
Field Joint Radial Growth Comparisons to PV-I ......
Fixed Housing Aft Dome Stress .............
PV-1Polysulfide Groove Fill Post-Test Radial Width
Measurements ........................ 47
PV-I Aft Exit Cone Forward End Phenolic Separations .... 48
PV-I Forward Exit Cone Bondline Separations ........ 50
PV-I Performance Summary With CPW1-3600 CEI Specification
Limits ........................... 73
Paqe
29
39
40
Nonrecoverable Channels, Prefire .............. 105
Instrumentation Anomalies ............... 105
Instrumentation Summary .................. II0
Photography and Video Coverage ............... 112
Photography and Video Coverage ............... 113
h _
i
F
w
=
REVISION B
89265-11.5
oocNo TWR-17592 I_
_c I _OE xi
uw
w
w
_ CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
ACRONYMS
AP .... ammonium perchlorate
ATVC ascent thrust vector control
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INTRODUCTION
The redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM), used in pairs, is the primary Space
Shuttle propulsive element, providing impulse and thrust vector control (TVC)
from solid rocket motor (SRM) ignition to solid rocket booster (SRB)
separation. The Space Shuttle Production Verification Motor (PV-I) test was
a full-scale RSRM static firing. This test report includes a discussion of
PV-I performance and of test results compliance with the RSRM development and
certification test program. A major focus of this report is placed on the
test objectives, anomalies, and motor performance.
PV-I was successfully fired on ]8 Aug ]988 at the Morton Thiokol, Utah-
based operations, test bay T-24. Two incidents delayed the PV-I firing date.
The first incident was the overpressurization of the TVC hydraulic system in
the aft skirt. The QM-6 aft skirt was used to replace the damaged skirt.
The second incident was where the leak check high pressure line was connected
to the center field joint capture feature O-ring to primary O-ring cavity
causing the capture feature O-ring to be extruded into the J-insulation area.
Recovery required the disassembly of the motor to the center field joint for
repairs. The test was conducted in accordance with the requirements of
CTP-O055, "Space Shuttle Process Verification Motor (PV-]) Static Fire Test
Plan." Postfire inspection procedures followed TWR-16473, Volumes I through
IX.
1.1 TEST ARRANGEMENT AND FACILITIES
The PV-I static test arrangement was in accordance with Drawings 2U65151 and
7U76254 and is shown in Figure 1.1-I. Test bay T-24 is equipped with a water
deluge system and a CO2 quench. The aft skirt (Figure I.]-2) and the igniter
area were conditioned by separate external heating sources.
1.2 TEST ITEM DESCRIPTION
The PV-] static test article was configured to best approximate the RSRM
flight motors, with the exception of the intentional flaws (Figure 1.2-I).
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Figure 1.1-1. PV-1 Static Test Motor During Assembly at T-24 Test Bay
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The static test RSRM consisted of a lined, insulated, segmented rocket motor
case loaded with solid propellant; ignition system complete with electro-
mechanical safety and arming device (S&A), initiators, and loaded igniter;
and a movable nozzle with flexible bearing and exit cone. A 360-deg external
tank attach (ETA) ring (primary structure only) and an SRB aft skirt were
attached with TVC systems and actuators, electrical and instrumentation
items, and a thermal curtain assembly. The motor was instrumented to provide
data to satisfy the test objectives. An overall view of the PV-I test
article is shown in Figure ].2-2.
].2.1 PropellaDt
The RSRM propellant, TP-H1148, is a composite-type solid propellant, formu-
lated of polybutadiene acrylonitrile/acrylic acid copolymer (PBAN) binder,
epoxy curing agent, ammonium perchlorate (AP) oxidizer, and aluminum powder
fuel. A small amount of burning rate catalyst (iron oxide) is added to
achieve targeted propellant burn rate.
The forward segment propellant grain design consists of an ll-point star
with a smooth bore-to-fin cavity transition region that tapers into a cylin-
drical perforated (CP) configuration. The two center segments are double-
tapered CP configurations, and an aft segment is a triple-tapered CP con-
figuration with a cutout for the partially submerged nozzle (Figure 1.2.1-]).
The aft segment nozzle cutback region is formed using net cast molding.
].2.2 Insulation
The internal insulation configuration for the RSRM is designed to provide
thermal protection to the case during motor operation and subsequent heat
soak, provide stress relief for the propellant grain, and provide a
chemically compatible stratum to which the liner/propellant is bonded.
The internal insulation system includes case acreage insulation, joint
insulation, joint bondlines, propellant stress relief flaps, forward-facing
full web nitrile butadiene rubber (NBR) inhibitors, and aft-facing partial
web castable inhibitors.
The materials to be used in the RSRM internal insulation system are the
same as those used in the high performance motor (HPM) configuration, with
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the exception of the joint adhesives. Asbestos silica-filled NBR, STW4-262],
is the material used for the primary case sidewall insulation, factory
joints, field joints, case-to-nozzle joint, stress relief flaps, and the
forward-facing inhibitors. A portion of the material used in the case
sidewall layup in the aft end of the center segments beneath the stress
relief flap and in the aft dome consists of carbon fiber-filled ethylene
propylene diene monomer rubber (CF/EPDM), STW4-2868.
The bonding material selected for bonding the primary case insulation to
the D6AC steel case is a two-part primer/adhesive system. The selected
system is Chemlok ® 205 primer and Chemlok adhesive. Chemlok is used where
CF/EPDM is bonded to the NBR in the aft dome and in the center segments
beneath the propellant stress relief flaps.
The adhesive used in the assembled J-insulation field joint configu-
ration is a liquid pressure-sensitive adhesive conforming to STW5-3479. This
material is a pressure-sensitive adhesive dispersed in methylchloroform
solvent. The adhesive used in the case-to-nozzle joint is a two-part
polysulfide adhesive (STW4-331]).
The liner material is an asbestos-filled carboxyl-terminated poly-
butadiene (CTPB) polymer which bonds the propellant to the case insulation in
the SRM.
The inhibitor is the same as the HPM with castable inhibitors on the aft
end of the forward and center segments. The aft facing inhibitor material is
a CTPB polymer. NBR inhibitors are used on the forward face of the center
and aft segments. The external insulation includes vulcanized silica-filled
EPDM insulation over the factory joints.
].2.3 Nozzle/TVC
The nozzle assembly is a partially submerged convergent/divergent movable
design with an aft pivot point flexible bearing (Figure ].2.3-1). The bond-
line area in the flex bearing/fixed housing nozzle internal Joint 5 was
intentionally flawed (Figure 1.2.3-2) to allow pressure to reach the primary
O-ring. The aft skirt assembly which was attached to the aft segment con-
tains the TVC system comprised of two SRB actuators and two hydraulic power
units (HPU).
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Figure 1.2.3-1. RSRM Nozzle Assembly
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The HPU Ground Test Controller, HPU manual/automatic panel (MAP), and
the ascent thrust vector control (ATVC) units served as the control units for
the TVC subsystem. A block diagram of the TVC subsystem and controllers are
shown in Figure ].2.3-3.
There was no linear shaped charge on PV-].
1.2.4 Case/Seals
The case consists of 11 individual segments: the forward dome, 6 cylinder
segments, the ETA segment, 2 stiffener segments, and the aft dome. The ]I
segments are preassembled into four subassemblies before propellant casting.
These four subassemblies are the forward segment assembly, the forward center
assembly, the aft center segment assembly, and the aft segment assembly.
These individual casting segments are joined by means of capture feature tang
and clevis field joints, which in turn are heldtogether by pins. The
assembled case was approximately 116 ft in length and ]2 ft in diameter
(Figure 1.2.4-]).
Factory joints were configured with RSRM case segments and RSRM insu-
lation configuration (Figure ].2.4-2). Teflon" tape was added to all factory
joints to prevent the NBR from bonding to the case providing a stress relief.
A vulcanized weatherseal was installed at the factory joints.
The three field joints were configured with interference fit, capture
feature joint hardware, and bonded RSRM (flight configuration) J-joint
insulation configuration (Figure 1.2.4-3). The clevis-to-capture feature
void (V2) was filled with fluorocarbon joint filler. The center field joint
had a pressure-assuring flaw to the capture feature O-ring (channel defect in
clevis insulation; V2 filler oriented with gap in line with flaw at ]35 deg)
as shown in Figure ].2.4-4. The aft field joint also had a pressure-assuring
flaw to the primary O-ring (channel defect in clevis and tang insulation;
flawed capture feature O-ring; V2 filler oriented with gap in line with flaw
at 135 deg) as shown in Figures 1.2.4-5 through 1.2.4-7. The case-to-nozzle
joint incorporated an RSRM fixed housing with 100 (0.875-in. dia) radial
bolts and an RSRM interference fit bonded insulation configuration (Figure
1.2.4-8). The case-to-nozzle joint had a pressure-assuring flaw to the
primary O-ring (polysulfide blowhole flaw and flawed wiper O-ring) as shown
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Propellant
10.0 in.
1.7 in.
NBR
Insulation
0 deg
A018723a
Clevis
Knife Scratch
Insulation Cut
Edge Separation
Figure 1.2.4-4. Center Field Joint Flaw (Clevis)
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in Figures 1.2.4-9 through 1.2.4-]]. The igniter-to-forward dome joint had
two artificial edge separations induced 180 deg apart in the forward dome
insulation (Figure 1.2.4-12). A simplified joint protection system (JPS) was
installed on all three field joints.
Fluorocarbon (STW4-333g) O-rings were employed for all primary and
secondary seals/O-rings, the field joint capture feature, and the case-to-
nozzle joint wiper O-rings. Case joints were assembled using long pins,
3-piece hat retainer band, and custom shims. Custom vent port plugs were
installed in one joint. Corrosion protection consisted of full external
paint and a thin film of grease (including O-rings, sealing surfaces, and
pinholes).
1.2.5 lqnition System
The RSRM ignition system is a modified HPM igniter. It contains a single
nozzle, steel chamber thickened at the nozzle end, external insulation, and
tapered internal insulation, new liner material, vacuum putty from a new
manufacturer, and solid propellant configured with a case-bonded 40-point
star grain (Figure ].2.5-I). The forward-mounted igniter is modified with a
CO2 quench port. A joint strip heater was installed on the igniter to ensure
]O0"F minimum at the gaskets for PV-]. An RSRM S&A device is installed on
the igniter. Ultrasonically torqued bolts fastened the ignition system in
place.
1.2.6 JPS/Weathersea!ZSvstems Tunnel
The simplified JPS installed on each field joint consisted of heaters and
sensors only. The heaters consist of primary and redundant chemically etched
foil circuits which are superimposed upon one another and laminated in
Kapton ® and fluoroethylene polymer Teflon. The heating surface is 1.25 in.
wide and has a total thickness of approximately 0.062 inch. The underside of
the heaters Kapton surface is coated with a pressure-sensitive adhesive.
This adhesive provides bonding to the case during assembly. The lead wires
extend from the heaters and are terminated in electrical connectors.
Adjacent to the heater are two temperature sensor assemblies.
contains two resistance temperature detector (RTD) sensors.
covered with a 0.25-in. thick strip of cork (Figure 1.2.6-I).
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Figure 1.2.4-9. Case-to-Nozzle Insulation Bondline Defect
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CL Polysulfide Flaw
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Figure 1.2.4-10. Case-to-Nozzle Joint Flaw
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Figure 1.2.4-12.
B
270 deg Note: Sufficient putty
will be removed to ensure
pressurization of the separation
Igniter-to-Forward Dome Edge Separation Locations
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held in place over the heaters and sensors by a single Kevlar band. The
moisture seal and cork insulation were not installed on this motor. No
systems tunnel was installed on PV-].
The PV-I drawing tree is included in Appendix A. PV-I deviations from
flight configuration are listed in Table 1.2.6-I.
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TEST OBJECTIVES
The PV-] test objectives were derived from objectives in TWR-15723 to satisfy
the requirements of Specification CPW1-3600, Addendum D, dated 3 Aug 1987.
Qualification Objectives (CEI Paraqraph)
A Certify the motor performance at ambient temperature. (3.2.1)
Certify the ignition interval. (3.2.1.1.].I)
Certify the pressure rise rate. (3.2.1.1.1.2)
Determine the thrust-time curve for PV-] and apply the data to the
nominal thrust-time curve for certification of the RSRM design.
(3.2.1.I.2.1)
Certify the performance tolerances and limits. (3.2.].].2.2)
Determine the impulse attained by PV-I and apply the data to the
nominal thrust-time curve for certification of the RSRM design.
(3.2.1.1.2.4)
Certify that all RSRM seals, except the center and aft field joints
and nozzle-to-case joints and igniter-to-case joints, but including
adjustable vent port plug seals in the forward field joint,
experience no erosion or blowby throughout the static test, if
pressurized. (3.2.1.2)
Certify the sealing performance of the center and aft field joints
and the nozzle-to-case and igniter-to-case joints. (3.2.1.2)
Certify the verifiability of the RSRM seals (except for the case-
to-nozzle joint primary seal, the factory joint primary seal, the
fixed housing-to-aft end ring primary seal, the igniter dual seal
plugs (5 places), and the operational pressure transducer (OPT)
primary and secondary seals). (3.2.1.2)
Certify that the forward field joint seals, if pressurized,
accommodate static test motor structural deflections. (3.2.1.2.1.a)
K Certify that the center and aft field joint and the nozzle-to-case
joint accommodate static test motor structural deflections.
(3.2.].2.1.a)
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Certify that the forward field joint seals, if pressurized, operate
at ambient temperature. (3.2.1.2.].b)
M Certify that the center and aft field joint and nozzle-to-case
joint operate at ambient temperature. (3.2.1.2.].b)
Certify that the case field joint and case-to-nozzle joint seal
verification does not degrade the performance or integrity of the
sealing system. (3.2.].2.].c)
Certify that the bore seals for the forward and center field joint
are verifiable in the proper direction. (3.2.].2.1.d)
Certify that the case-to-nozzle joint O-ring temperature is
maintained prior to static firing. (3.2.1.2.].f)
Certify that the factory joint insulation as a seal accommodates
static test motor structural deflections and erosion. (3.2.1.2.2.a)
Certify that the factory joint insulation as a seal operates at
ambient temperature. (3.2.1.2.2.b)
Certify that the insulation performs the seal function for the
factory joint. (3.2.1.2.2.d)
T Certify that the factory joint insulation is adequate to preclude
leaks. (3.2.1.2.2.e.)
U Certify that the flex bearing accommodates static test motor
structural deflections. (3.2.1.2.3.a)
V Certify that the flex bearing operates as a seal at ambient
temperature. (3.2.1.2.3.b)
W Certify that the flex bearing seal verification does not degrade
the performance or integrity of the sealing system. (3.2.1.2.3.c)
Certify that the flex bearing maintains a positive gas seal between
its internal components. (3.2.1.2.3.d}
Y Certify that the ignition seals, if pressurized, except for the
igniter-to-case joint, accommodate static test motor structural
deflections. (3.2.1.2.4.a)
Z Certify that the igniter-to-case joint accommodates static test
motor structural deflection. (3.2.].2.4.a)
AA Certify that the ignition seals, if pressurized, except for the
igniter-to-case joint, operate at ambient temperature.
(3.2.1.2.4.b)
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AB
AC
AD
Certify that the igniter-to-case joint operates at ambient
temperature. (3.2.].2.4.b)
Certify that the ignition system seal verification does not degrade
the performance or integrity of the sealing system. (3.2.1.2.4.c)
Certify that the nozzle internal seals, except for Joint 5, and the
aft exit cone field joint seals, if pressurized, can accommodate
static test motor structural deflections. (3.2.1.2.5.a)
AE Certify that the nozzle internal Joint 5 can accommodate static
test motor structural deflections. (3.2.].2.5.a)
AF
AG
AH
AI
AJ
AK
AL
AM
AN
AO
AP
Certify that the nozzle internal seals, except Joint 5 and the aft
exit cone field joint seals, if pressurized, operate at ambient
temperature. (3.2.1.2.5.b)
Certify that the nozzle internal Joint 5 operates at ambient
temperature. (3.2.].2.5.b)
Certify that the nozzle internal seals and the aft exit cone field
joint seals verification does not degrade the performance or
integrity of the sealing system. (3.2.1.2.5.c)
Certify that the bore seals for the nozzle are verifiable in the
proper direction. (3.2.1.2.5.e)
Certify that the case is capable of containing the static test
internal pressure. (3.2.1.3.a)
Certify that the c_se ETA risers do not degrade the integrity of
the case. (3.2.1._.c)
Certify by demonstrating horizontal assembly that the case segment
mating joints have provisions to ensure proper segment orientation
and alignment. (3.2.1.3.f)
Certify that the nozzle assembly and exit cone design are
compatible with the system performance requirements. (3.2.1.4,
Morton Thiokol-imposed)
Certify that the nozzle assembly is capable of vectoring through
the planned duty cycle. (3.2.].4.1)
Certify the geometric nozzle alignment. (3.2.1.4.2)
Certify the misalignment of the dynamic thrust vector with respect
to the nozzle centerline. (3.2.1.4.3, 3.2.1.4.3.a)
Aq Certify the radial offset between the dynamic thrust vector and the
nozzle centerline. (3.2.1.4.3, 3.2.1.4.3.b)
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AR Certify the null offset angle at 0 psi nozzle stagnation pressure.
(3.2.1.4.4.a)
AS Certify the null offset angle at 615 psi nozzle stagnation
pressure. (3.2.1.4.4.b)
AT Certify the null offset angle at 915 psi nozzle stagnation
pressure. (3.2.1.4.4.c)
AU Certify the nozzle assembly TVC actuator attach points. (3.2.1.4.8)
AV Certify the nozzle flame front liner design and fabrication.
(3.2.1.4.13)
AW Certify that the ignition system precludes hot gas leakage during
and subsequent to motor ignition. (3.2.1.5.a)
AX Certify by demonstration that the igniter and the S&A are separable
from each other. (3.2.1.5.b)
AY Certify the enable function of the S&A device. (3.2.1.5.].a)
AZ Certify the S&A change of position from safe to arm. (3.2.1.5.1.d)
BA Certify that the S&A device will provide simplex remote position
indication. (3.2.1.5.1.e)
BB Certify the igniter design. (3.2.1.5.2)
BC Certify that the RSRM design meets the electromagnetic
compatibility requirements. (3.2.1.6.e)
BD Certify the operation of the motor chamber pressure transducer and
its installation. (3.2.1.6.2.1)
BE Certify the installation and function of the ground environmental
instrumentation. (3.2.].6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-proposed SCN 3)
BF Certify the installation and operation of the strain gages (steel)
(aluminum) in the nozzle area. (3.2.1.6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-
proposed SCN 3)
BG Certify the installation and operation of the girth gages.
(3.2.].6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-proposed SCN 3)
BH Certify the installation and operation of the temperature devices.
(3.2.1.6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-proposed SCN 3)
BI Certify the installation and operation of the igniter chamber
pressure transducer. (3.2.].6.2.4.a, Addendum G)
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BJ
BK
BL
BL-]
BM
BN
Certify the calibration of the motor chamber pressure transducer.
(3.2.].6.2.4.b, Addendum G, ICD 3-44005, 4.3.4)
Certify the forward field joint insulation temperature control.
(3.2.1.8.1.1.a)
Certify the compatibility of the leak tests of seals of field
joints, nozzle-to-case joint, and igniter-to-case joint with joints
insulations. (3.2.1.8.I.1.b)
The insulation shall ensure that system performance and structural
integrity is maintained during the assembly process and operation.
(3.2.1.8.].1.c)
Certify that the forward field joint insulation provides seal
protection. (3.2.1.8.1.1.d)
Certify the ability of the insulation to protect the forward case
joint from thermal degradation during an ambient temperature full-
duration motor burn. (3.2.1.8.].I.e)
BO
BP
BQ
BR
BS
BT
Certify by inspection that the forward field joint insulation will
withstand slag accumulation during motor operation. (3.2.1.8.1.].g)
Certify that the ballistic performance is not affected by the field
joint, case-to-nozzle joint, and igniter-to-case joint insulation.
(3.2.1.8.].1.i)
Certify that the igniter insulation provides adequate thermal
protection for the main igniter chamber and adapter metal parts.
(3.2.].8.3)
Certify the ability of the field joint heater assembly to maintain
the temperature of the field joints. (3.2.].11.a)
Certify the inert weight by inspection. (3.2.2.2.])
Certify the propellant weight by inspection. (3.2.2.2.2)
BU Deleted
BV
BW
BX
Provide data for certification of the reliability of the RSRM
design. (3.2.3)
Certify that the primary structure, thermal protection and pressure
vessels meet design safety factors. (3.2.3.1)
Certify that the RSRM segments are capable of horizontal
assembly/disassembly. (3.2.5.1)
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BY Certify that the electrical bonding meets the requirements of MIL-
B-5087B. (3.3.5.2)
BZ
CA
CB
CC
CD
CE
CF
CG
Certify the installation of low pressure transducer fairings
(nonmetallic) and the triaxial accelerometer assembly mounting
block (metallic) on the forward dome. (3.3.6.1.1, MSFC-HDBK-505A)
Certify the case insulation minimum design thermal safety factor.
(3.3.6.1.2.2)
Certify the thermal design safety factor for the case insulation
adjacent to metal part field joints and extending over factory
joints. (3.3.6.1.2.3)
Certify the case insulation sandwich construction region (aft and
center segment aft end) design safety factor. (3.3.6.1.2.4)
Certify the insulation performance. (3.3.6.1.2.6)
Certify the nozzle design safety factors. (3.3.6.1.2.7)
Certify by demonstration that the RSRM design minimizes the need
for new on-plant logistics facilities, and that existing facilities
and facility equipment are used for the storage of spares and
maintenance functions to the maximum possible extent. (3.4.3)
Certify that the outer boot ring (OBR) shows: 1) no evidence of
hot gas erosion inside the flex boot cavity except that produced by
the ventholes, and 2) that OBR hoop continuity exists through the
beginning of motor pressure to tailoff.
--Delamination and wedgeout of 35-deg wrap acceptable
--Need not comply with CEI spec 3.2.1.4.13.b dealing
with general wedgeouts
CH Certify the function of the igniter heater. (3.2.1.5.3., SCN 42)
Developmental Ob.iectives
A
B
C
D
.Ev,=o.B
89265-4.6
Acquire engineering data for model validation.
Evaluate the use of the 3-in-1 gage for data collection.
Evaluate the nozzle Joint 2 bonding process change.
Measure joint gap opening in the nozzle internal joints.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 SUMMARY
All of the objectives that can be addressed to date have been met. All
inspection and instrumentation data indicate that the PV-I static test firing
was successful. Data were gathered at instrumented locations during pretest,
test, and post-test operations. Dimensional measurements were taken before
and after static testing to document insulation performance. The information
assembled from the test procedures has supplied valuable knowledge and
understanding about the performance of the RSRM design components utilized in
PV-I.
3.1.] Case Performance
No anomalies associated with case or joint hardware occurred in the PV-I
static test. Assembly procedures proved adequate, and valuable motor
structural response data were gathered during the test. Chamber pressure was
contained, and joint gap openings were restrained well under the maximum
allowable values. No local yielding was measured. TWR-17592, Volumes II and
IV contain a complete discussion of case performance.
3.1.1.1 Field Joints. All results were as expected. The radial growth
compared very closely to that on other static tests. The greatest value
occurred on the center field joint, and had a value of 0.181 in. (Table
3.].I.1-I). The gap opening for the center field joint was recorded as
0.008 in., which correlates closely with other tests. Biaxial strain gages
were placed near the case-to-nozzle joint to measure local strains, The
maximum calculated stress was found to be -47.0 ksi (Table 3.1.1.1-2).
3.1.2 Insulation Performance
3.1.2.] External Evaluation. Post-test inspection revealed no anomalies
related to the factory joint weather seal. There were no hotspots on the
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Table 3.1.1.1-1. Field Joint Radial Growth Comparison to PV-1
=
= =
=
= =
r_
= =
_=_
Center Field Joint Joint Pressure 848
STRAIN RADIAL GROWTH (Inches)
LOCATION GAGE PV-1 PV-I QM-7 QM-6 DM-9 DM-8 PRED
1 R304 BG BG ND ND 0.161 0.167 0.158
2 $966" 2208 0.162 0.166 0.142 0.163 0.163 0.148
3 $635 2472 0.181 0.183 0.174 0.184 0.184 0.183
Aft Field Joint Joint Pressure 838
STRAIN RADIAL GROWTH (Inches)
LOCATION GAGE PV-I PV-1 QM-7 QM-6 DM-9 DM-8 PRED.
1 R305 BG BG ND 0.158 0.160 0.166 0.152
2 $968" 2068 0.152 0.150 0.149 0.148 0.155 0.135
3 S686 2170 0.159 0.151 0.159 0.153 0.164 0.148
* PV-I, QM-7, QM-6, and DM-9 Locations are 1/3 Inch Aft of DM-8 Location.
BG Bad Gage Before Test
ND - No Data
ETA Ring
PV-I 360 degree
QM-7 360 degree
QM-6 360 degree
DM-9 360 degree
DM-8 270 degree
PRED 360 degree
J
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external case. PV-I slag weight was ],497 lb. The external water deluge
system operated correctly on PV-I, as did the CO2 forward and aft end quench
systems.
3.1.2.2 Case-to-Case Field Joints. Insulation performance in all three
case-to-case field joints was excellent. In the unflawed forward case field
joint, the joint bondline appeared to have made contact for the full cir-
cumference as evidenced by a postfire indication of adhesive contact. There
was no evidence of circumferential flow or hot gas penetration (i.e., sooting
and charring) into the joint beyond the nominal expected char and erosion.
No damage to the capture feature, primary, or secondary O-rings was observed.
The flawed center and aft case field joint insulation performance was
excellent. No evidence of gas flow was identified within the joint bondline
except as a result of the channel defects. The capture feature O-ring in the
center field joint was eroded in the circumferential area surrounding the
channel defect. The preliminary postfire condition of the intentional clevis
and tang edge separations in the center field joint indicates that the
separations had not grown from the installed prefire condition. The edges of
the tang and clevis insulation were slightly charred and fragile. The flawed
capture feature O-ring in the aft field joint was eroded through adjacent to
the channel defect. No heat effect or erosion of the primary or secondary
O-rings was identified in either of the flawed joints.
3.1.2.3 Case-to-Case Factory Joints. Disassembly and evaluation are not
complete.
3.1.2.4 Case-to-Nozzle Joipt. The case-to-nozzle joint had an intentional
gas path to the wiper O-ring, allowing pressure to reach the flawed wiper
O-ring. The pressure-assuring flaw through the polysulfide and the flawed
wiper O-ring allowed chamber gas to reach the primary O-ring. Although the
gas path was filled with char, no substantial erosion of the defect was
evident. Two voids in the polysulfide forward of the step on each side of
the precured polysulfide slabs which formed the gas path and two other voids
within the polysulfide bondline were identified. None of the voids extended
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across the entire bondline and none received hot gas. Two edge separations
were installed at the aft dome insulation-to-case interface on each side of
the intentional gas path. Preliminary results indicate the edge separations
had not grown from the prefire condition.
3.1.2.5 _omponent Team Evaluation. The Insulation Component Program Team
evaluation of observations will be presented in TWR-17592, Volume Ill. No
critical, major, or minor anomalies were identified, but a potential anomaly
that "remains observation" was identified (polysulfide voids).
TWR-17592, Volume Ill contains a detailed description of the insulation
test results.
3.1.3 Seals Component/Leak Check performance
3.].3.1 Field Joints. There was no evidence of gas blowby past any non-
flawed seal. The center field joint capture feature O-ring was eroded at the
flaw location, with a 0.027-in. cross section remaining at the greatest
eroded area, and still sealed. The aft field joint flawed capture feature
O-ring was completely eroded through the cross section at the flaw location,
but no soot was found past the interference fit, and no erosion or evidence
of blowby was found to the primary O-ring. Pressure transducers confirm
these findings.
3.1.3.2 Factory Joints. Disassembly and evaluation is not complete.
3.1.3.3 Case-to-Nozzle Joint. The flawed wiper O-ring was completely eroded
through at the flaw location, with 0.006 in. of erosion measured on the
primary O-ring at the flaw location with no evidence of soot or hot gas past
the forward groove wall. Pressure transducers confirm these findings.
3.1.3.4 lqniter Joints. All gaskets (inner, outer, and S&A) performed with
no signs of heat effect or sooting past the primary seals. All sealing sur-
faces were free of soot. The outer igniter gasket was in excellent condition
on the forward dome and adapter sides of the putty flaw locations. The
primary igniter gaskets revealed that no blowby or erosion had occurred. No
corrosion or hardware damage was observed.
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3.1.3.5 Exit Cone Field Joint (Joint I). A blowhole was found on the exit
cone field joint (Joint I) through the room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) at
224 deg. Soot was found at 224 deg on the glass phenolic, but did not reach
the primary O-ring. Inspection of the O-rings while in the grooves showed no
damage, erosion, or heat effects. One scratch was found on the primary
O-ring, and one scratch and one nick on the secondary O-ring. The nature of
this damage indicates the cause to be installation disassembly clips. RTV
was found up to the primary O-ring intermittently around the joint.
Heavy grease was found forward of the primary O-ring on the glass
phenolic of the forward exit cone at 182 deg. The grease caused a termi-
nating void in the RTV on the glass phenolic forward of the primary O-ring
approximately 1.5 in. circumferentially by 0.1875 in. radially. A small
streak of fluorescent green-colored grease was found on the steel of the
forward exit cone next to the glass phenolic approximately 360 deg around the
joint. A streak of black discolored grease was found on the steel on the
forward exit cone across from the polysulfide on the aft exit cone
intermittently 360 deg around the joint.
No corrosion was found.
3.1.3.6 Internal Nozzle Joints. Inspection of the forward end ring-to-nose
inlet housing (Joint 2) revealed two major pressure paths through the RTV.
Soot and sooted grease were present up to but not past the primary O-ring.
There were eight areas where pressure reached the primary seal at some
point during the test firing on the forward exit cone-to-throat support
housing (Joint 4). Some of the RTV voids were caused by grease being hy-
draulically forced up into the RTV bondline during joint assembly. It is
believed that the other voids occurred at the time of the backfill operation.
No anomalies were found to the nose inlet housing-to-throat support
housing (Joint 3). No damage was found during inspection of the primary
and secondary O-rings out of the groove. Preliminary inspection of the
sealing surface revealed no signs of damage. Excess grease was noted in the
bottom of both O-ring grooves.
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The intentional flaw on the fixed housing-to-aft end ring (Joint S)
allowed pressure to reach the primary O-ring. No evidence of soot or blowby
past the primary O-ring was found. TWR-16416 documented evaluation of
Joint 5. TWR-I7592, Volume IV contains a complete discussion of seal
performance.
3.1.3.7 Leak Test. Based on the success of current leak test procedures
used on PV-I, QM-6, and QM-7, it is concluded that all leak tests currently
performed on RSRM joints are certified for use on flight motors. TWR-17592,
Volume IV contains a description of leak check procedure test results.
3.1.4 Nozzle Assembly Performance
3.1.4.1 Forward and Aft Exit Cones. PV-I aft exit cone and forward exit
cone liner erosion was nominal showing no major washing or pocketing. Minor
surface ply lifting and minor wash areas were observed intermittently around
the aft exit cone circumference, aft of the compliance ring. Maximum depth
of the wash areas was 0.15 in. radially. Erosion forward of the compliance
ring was smooth and uniform. Typical dimpled erosion (O.15-in. maximum
radial depth) appeared on the forward 6 in. of the liner 360 deg circum-
ferentially. The forward end of the liner appeared to be pulled away from
the shell over a 1.5-ft arc centered at 160 deg. The aft exit cone liner was
raised approximately 0.20 in. above the forward exit cone liner at this
location.
The polysulfide groove fill on the aft exit cone forward end showed
separations within the polysulfide. Locations and dimensions are presented
in Figure 3.1.4.1-I. The maximum radial width of the separations was
O.IO inch. Post-test measurements of the polysulfide groove radial width
showed that the groove was up to 0.11 in. wider than the nominal pretest
size (Table 3.1.4.1-I), indicating that the liner pulled away from the shell
during post-test cooldown. There were no subsurface voids.
The aft exit cone forward end showed glass-cloth phenolic (GCP)/carbon-
cloth phenolic (CCP) separations intermittently around the circumference.
The maximum separation was 0.22 inch. Table 3.1.4.1-2 lists the locations
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Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
Fwd Exit Cone
Assembly
)ve Fill
Aft Exit Cone
Assembly
m
m
m
Glass-Cloth
Phenolic
Steel
No Polysulfide Separation -
Location
(deg)
120
135
165
180
195
210
225
3O0
Radial
Width (in.)
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.08
0.04
0.09
0.10
Type
• Shell/Poly
Shell/Poly
Poly/Glass
Poly/Glass
Poly/Glass
Poly/Glass
ShelllPoly
Within Poly
A023056a
Glass-Cloth
Phenolic
Aluminum
0.15 in.
Polysulfide appeared
to shrink axially away
from Joint interface
_0.15 in. max
Figure 3.1.4.1-1, PV-1 Polysulfide Separations
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Table 3.1.4.1-1. PV-1 Polysu!fide Groove
Fill Post-Test Radial Width Measurements
= .
m
Angular Radial
Location Width
(deg) (in.)
0 0.18
15 0.16
30 0.16
45 0.16
60 0,16
75 0.16
90 0.16
105 0.16
120 0.16
135 0.15
150 0.16
165 0.18
180 0.17
195 0.16
210 0.17
225 0.17
240 0.16
255 0.16
270 0.16
285 0.16
30O 0.16
315 0.16
330 0.16
345 0.16
Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
imw
Aft Exit Cone
Assembly
Polysuifide Groove Fill
EA 946
I Glass-
I Cloth
I Phenolic
Aluminum
A023058a
REVISION B OOCNO TWR-17592 VOL
SEC I _QE 47
DCORPORA ON
SPA CE OPERA TIONS
Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
Separations at
GCP-to-CCP Interface
Aft Exit Cone
Assembly
Polysulfide Groove Fill
EA 946
Glass-
Cloth
Phenolic
Aluminum
Location
(deQ)
105
120
150
165
210
225
270
285
GCP/CCP Separation
Radial Width
(In.)
0.01
0.03
0.22
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.08
0,12
A018722a
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Table 3.1.4.1-2. PV-I Aft Exit Cone Forward End Phenolic Separations
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and dimensions of the separations. The forward exit cone aft end showed a
bondline separation extending 360 deg circumferentially. The forward end of
the forward exit cone showed bondline separations intermittently around the
circumference which were a maximum of 0.07 in. wide radially. Table
3.1.4.1-3 lists the locations and dimensions of the separations. There were
no signs of heat effect in or adjacent to any of the separations.
3.1.4.2 Throat Assembly. Erosion of the throat ring and throat inlet ring
was smooth and uniform, typical of past motors. The aft end of the throat
assembly showed intermittent bondline separations. The maximum radial width
was 0.005 inch. Figure 3.1.4.2-I lists the locations and dimensions of the
separations.
3.1.4.3 No_ Inlet Assembly. All regions of the nose inlet assembly eroded
smoothly, with no visible pockets or wash areas, The aft 2 in. of the nose
cap showed popped-up charred CCP material intermittently around the part
circumference (Figure 3.].4.3-]). No wedgeouts were observed on the forward
or aft ends of the nose cap. Bondline separations were observed on the nose
cap aft end and also between the GCP and CCP intermittently around the cir-
cumference. Figure 3.1.4.3-2 lists the locations and dimensions of the
separations.
Post-test examination revealed that the forward nose ring was of the old
HPM design configuration with the 150-deg ply angle. An investigation is
underway to determine how the old design forward nose ring was mistakenly
placed in an RSRM nose inlet assembly. The erosion of the forward nose ring
and aft inlet ring was smooth and uniform. There were no wedgeouts or
popped-up charred CCP material on either of the rings. A continuous bondline
separation of 0.004 in. radial width was observed on the aft end of the -504
ring. This condition has been observed on previous post-test and postflight
nozzles.
3.1.4.4 Cowl Rina. Erosion of the cowl ring was approximately 0.]5 in.
greater on the forward 4.5 in. of the ring. Popped-up charred CCP material
was observed on the aft end of the cowl at 220 deg (Figure 3.].4.4-]).
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Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
B
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GCP/CCP'-_ Phenolic (Separations
Forward End
GCP/CCP
Separations
Radial
Location Separation
(deg) (in.)
0 0.05
15 0.03
30 0.05
45 --
60 0.05
75 0.07
90 0.03
105 0.05
120 0.03
135 0.03
150 0.04
165 0,05
180 0.05
195 --
210 0.02
225 0.05
240 0.02
255 0.03
270 --
285 0.01
300 --
315 --
33O 0.O2
345 0.03
EA 946
Adhesive
Forward Exit C
Assembly
Glass-Cloth
Phenolic
Steel
Aft End
Metal-to-Adhesive
Bondline Separations
Radial Axial
Location Separation Length
(deg) (in,) (in.)
0 0.05 >4
15 0.06 >4
30 0.07 >4
45 0.08 >4
60 0.08 >4
75 0.08 >4
90 0.07 >4
105 0.07 >4
120 0.07 >4
135 0.06 >4
150 0.06 >4
165 0.04 >4
180 0.04 >4
195 0.06 >4
210 0.06 >4
225 0.08 >4
240 0.08 >4
255 0.07 >4
270 0.04 >4
285 0.06 >4
300 0.07 >4
315 0.08 >4
330 0.06 >4
345 0.07 >4
m
A023055a
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Table 3.1.4.1-3. PV-1 Forward Exit Cone Bondline Separations
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Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
Throat Inlet
Forward End
913NA
No Separations
Carbon-Cloth
Phenolic
Throat
Aft End
Steel
LEA 913NA
_-- Glass-Cloth
Phenolic
A023054a
Separations --
Between Adhesive
and Metal
Aft End
Metal-to-Adhesive
Bondline Separations
Location
(deg)
60
75
165
180
195
Radial
Width(in.)
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
w
REVISION
Figure 3.1.4.2-1. PV-1 Throat Assembly Bondline Separations
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Nose Inlet
Assembly
CCP
-504 Ring
GCP
0.044-1n. Wide Bondline Separation Between
Adhesive and Housing From 300 to 0 to 70 deg
( .n OO,,Oo,
Location
(deg)
0
15
30
45
60
140
142
192-198
255
304
306-312
Nose Cap Aft End
Radial Bondline
Separation (in.)
0.040
0.040
0.030
0.020
0.008
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.030
0.010
0.008
Separation
Type*
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
3
3
AO23053a
* Type 1 = GCPICCP
Type 2 = AdhesivelGCP
Type 3 Metal/Adhesive
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Cross-ply cracks isolated in charred CCP material extended axially through
the ventholes. Unlike other motor nozzles, the shear pinholes extended only
into the silica-cloth phenolic due to new assembly procedures. All cowl
ventholes appeared plugged with slag (Figures 3.1.4.4-2 through 3.1.4.4-5).
There were no bondline separations observed on the forward end of the cowl
assembly.
3.1.4.5 Outer Boot Rinq. The structural backup OBR was intact.
Delaminations, attributed to two-sided heating and cooldown, were observed
360 deg circumferentially. Charred CCP material on the aft tip fractured and
popped up over a majority of the circumference, but there was no missing
material. Popped-up charred CCP material was also located on the forward 1.5
in. of the OBR at 216 deg. Both of these conditions have been observed on
previous post-test and postflight nozzles and have been shown to occur after
motor operation. The flow surface bondline gap between the OBR and cowl ring
was 0.20 in., which is typical of past static test and flight nozzles. The
cavity side of the flex boot showed no evidence of flow or erosion.
3.1.4.6 Fixed Hou$inq Insulation. Erosion was smooth and uniform and
appeared typical of previous motors. There were no bondline separations
located on the aft or forward ends of the fixed housing assembly.
3.1.4.7 Nozzle Pluq. There was no nozzle plug installed in the PV-I nozzle.
3.1.4.8 Nozzle Internal Joints. Post-test subassembly flow surface gaps are
shown in Figure 3.1.4.8-].
3.1.4.8.1 Aft Exit Cone/Forward Exit Cone Field Joint. A blowpath
approximately 0.15 in. wide circumferentially extended from the flow surface,
through the RTV, to an unfilled void area located at 224 deg (Figures
3.1.4.8.1-I and 3.1.4.8.1-2). The GCP of the aft and forward exit cone was
lightly sooted at the blowpath location, but was not heat affected. Soot did
not reach the primary O-ring. The primary O-ring saw pressure, but showed no
signs of blowby, erosion, or heat effect. There was no metal damage
observed.
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Figure 3.1.4.8-1. PV-1 Joint Flow Surface Gap Openings
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3.1.4.8.2 Throat Inlet/Forward Exit Cone Joint. The RTV backfill of the
forward exit cone/throat nozzle joint did not extend below the joint char
line at the 45-, 50-, 65-, 75-, 100-, 195-, 225-, and 262.5-deg locations.
Soot was observed at these unfilled areas indicating pressure reached the
primary O-ring, although it showed no evidence of blowby, erosion, or heat
effect. There was no sign of heat-affected CCP or GCP below the joint char
line and no metal damage observed in this joint.
3.].4.8.3 Nose Inlet/Throat Joint. The backfilled RTV extended below the
joint char line 360 deg circumferentially. RTV extended along the radial
inside diameter (ID) bondline intermittently around the circumference and
along the axial bondline. There were no voids or blowpaths observed in the
RTV, and the joint was free of soot. There was no metal damage observed.
3.1.4.8.4 Nose In]et/Bearing Forward End Ring/Cowl Joint. The PV-] nozzle
was the first to incorporate the RTV backfill on the nose inlet/bearing for-
ward end ring/cowl joint. The RTV backfill appeared to extend below the
joint char line 360 deg circumferentially and reached the GCP intermittently.
Blowpaths, the largest one measuring 0.88 in. wide circumferentially, ex-
tended from the flame surface through the RTV to the unfilled void areas.
The paint on the bearing forward end ring flange outside diameter (OD) sur-
face was blistered, indicating heat effect. Soot also reached the nose inlet
housing aft end axial boltholes over most of the circumference. The primary
O-ring saw pressure, but showed no signs of blowby, erosion, or heat effect.
The nose cap GCP and the cowl silica-cloth phenolic insulators in line with
the largest blowpath were heat affected.
3.1.4.8.5 Fixed Housing/Bearing Aft End Ring Joint. RTV filled the radial
portion of the fixed housing/bearing aft end ring joint circumferentially
"except at the intentional flaw location from 253 to 268 deg. Soot was
observed on the radial portion and on the aft 0.25 in. of the axial portion
of the bondline at the flaw location. Soot did not extend to the steel
bearing aft end ring and primary O-ring. The primary O-ring _aw pressure but
showed no signs of b]owby, erosion, or heat effect. The remainder of the
joint circumference showed no blowpaths or soot. Small isolated voids were
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observed within the radial portion of the bondline intermittently around the
circumference. There was no metal damage observed in the joint.
3.1.4.9 Flex Bearinq Performance. Evaluation is not complete.
3.1.4.10 Nozzle Thrust Vector Control Performance. The TVC system appears
to have performed as planned and followed the specified duty cycle well.
3.1.4.11 Nozzle Composite Structures Performance. The structural integrity
of the nozzle was verified; the instrumentation data demonstrated positive
safety margins at all locations measured. In general, predicted strains
correlated fairly well with measured values. Nozzle strains are generally
low. Excluding the counterbore region at the forward end of the fixed
housing, strain magnitudes are less than 2,000 pin./inch. Several strain
plots in the nose inlet housing region exhibited strain aberrations at about
the 14-sec time slice. Most noticeable are the axial components at Location
5, and the hoop and axial components at Location 7, near the aft end of the
nose inlet housing. Other gages demonstrating responses of a lower magnitude
at this time slice include hoop longwire gages at Locations J6 and J7
(Joint No. 2 proximity gages), Jg and J10 (Joint No. 3), and Location g. An
investigation of the cause of this event is currently being conducted.
Despite these unexpected changes in strain magnitude, peak strains remained
relatively low (less than 2,000 #in./in.), indicating metal part margins of
safety were well above zero. Hoop strains tend to follow the pressure trace,
and most strain predictions match test results well.
Strain and deflection measurements in all five internal nozzle joint
regions supported analysis predictions that all sealing surfaces either
closed or opened less than 2 mil. Note that this was the case of Joint 5
with a pressure-assuring flaw to the primary seal.
Bondline separation gages located in the forward and aft exit cone shear
pinholes indicated no bond gap separations during static firing. TWR-]7592,
Volume V contains a detailed description of nozzle/flex bearing/ composite
structures/TVC test results.
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3.1.5 lqniter Performance
The RSRM ignition system is a forward end, internally mounted, solid rocket-
type igniter which is 47.5 in. long and contains approximately 132 Ib of TP-
H1178 propellant (Figure 3.1.5-I). The PV-I igniter had two intentional
putty flaws located in the igniter adapter-to-forward dome joint. The flaws
were located at 0 and 80 deg. Postfire inspection revealed no anomalies
associated with the putty flaws. Postfire inspection of the S&A device
(Figure 3.1.5-2) showed the system performed as predicted with no anomalies.
A detailed description of the PV-I igniter performance will be in TWR-17592,
Volume VI.
3.1.5.1 lqniter Heater Performance. The igniter heater, used to condition
the igniter inner, outer, and S&A gasket rubber seals within temperature
requirements, consists of a 430-W flexible strip heater which wraps around
the igniter adapter flange. Thick cork (0.25-in.) is wrapped around the
heater, and the heater and cork are secured in place with a steel T-bolt
latch band clamp. The heater performed as required until building rollaway
when one temperature sensor dropped from 128 ° to 115°F as a result of
convective cooling.
One anomaly for the igniter heater was noted. The heater buckled off
the surface of the igniter adapter in two places, which caused two hot spots
on the heater and resulted in charred heater insulation in those areas.
Testing of the heater subsequently showed no degradation of insulation
resistance, dielectric withstanding voltage, or continuity.
3.1.6 JPS/Factorv Joint Weatherseal Performance
3.1.6.1 JP....SS.The simplified field joint protection system for PV-I con-
sisted of heaters and sensors only. These were covered with a 0.25-in. thick
strip of cork (Figure 1.2.6-I). The cork was held in place over the heaters
and sensors by a single Kevlar bond. The moisture seal and cork insulation
were not installed on this motor.
The heater performed as designed. There were no anomalies.
w
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Field joint heaters maintained the temperature at the controlling
resistance temperature detector at or above ]O0°F, and maintained this
temperature with a maximum deviation of -0.1 ° and +O.4"F.
Figure 3.1.6.]-I is a plot of the temperature at the controlling RTDs of
the three joints. The drop in temperature at 1000 hr is due to heater power
shut off during the dry run.
Figure 3.].6.1-2 is an expanded plot of the controlling RTD temperature.
The maximum deviation in temperature was -0.I° and +O.4°F.
Figure 3.1.6.1-3 is a plot of the minimum differential temperatures of
the three joints. The maximum of 18.8°F occurred on the aft joint at ]240
hr, when the last data were recorded.
=ram
i
3.1.7 Systems Tunnel
There was no systems tunnel on PV-I per the Redesign Program Review Board
directive.
3.].8 Instrumentation
mm
--4
m
All instrumentation-related test objectives were met. Instrumentation per-
formed well with only a few exceptions. A detailed discussion is included in
Section 5 of this volume.
3.1.9 Ground SUDDOrt EQuipment
m
m
m
All ground support equipment (GSE) used on PV-] is discussed in the
applicable component volume of TWR-17592.
3.1.10 Loads and Environments
The PV-I static test was completed successfully with case line loads much
lower than those experienced in the lift-off phase of flight, which is the
highest load phase. The stresses experienced by the nozzle actuator bracket
were calculated and found to be far lower than the yield stress of the
bracket material.
l
m
w
3.I.11 Ballistics/Mass Properties Performance
The PV-] ballistic performance was typical and within expected limits. The
intentional flaws in the joints and the insulation had no noticeable affect
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on the performance of the motor. The new forward segment transition block
could not be linked with abnormal gas flow or pressure disturbances. Ig-
nition interval and pressure rise rate limits were met. Impulse gates were
met. The PV-] ballistic performance compared closely with QM-7, QM-6, DM-9,
and DM-8 performance and HPM historical data. Table 3.1.11-I lists the
predicted and reconstructed values for the performance of PV-I against the
CPWl-3600 specification Table 2 values. All the values were within the
limits. Figures 3.1.11-I and 3.1.11-2 shows the predicted values versus the
measured head end pressure and vacuum thrust values, respectively.
Isp continues to be higher than the original HPM baseline value. Isp as
well as the thrust time envelope baselines need to be updated with measured
increase in specific impulse (Isp)- PV-I slag accumulation theory associated
with the AP particle size distribution needs to be further investigated. The
modified igniter performed successfully and as predicted.
The PV-I motor exhibited chamber pressure oscillation similar to
previously tested Space Shuttle RSRMs, particularly the QM-7 motor. The
first longitudinal (l-L) mode oscillations experienced by PV-I were the
strongest ever measured by an ac coupled transducer in a Space Shuttle motor.
The data from the dynamic pressure gage which provided oscillatory head end
chamber pressure is displayed in waterfall plot format in Figure 3.1.11-3. A
possible cause for the increased oscillations from HPM to RSRM is the change
in the joint insulation. The clevis-side base thickness of the insulation
has decreased, and late in burn time the NBR inhibitor is supported by this
insulation. This would allow more flexibility in the inhibitor and cause
increased pressure oscillation. Investigation into this theory is being
conducted.
TWR-17592, Volume XI contains a complete discussion of the performance
results from PV-I.
3.1.12 Aero/Thermal
The main objective of the flow/thermal/erosion analysis was to compare the
predictions to the test results. Full details of the predictions for PV-I
are presented in TWR-17592, Volume X. Considering the thermal objectives,
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Table 3.1.11-I. PV-I Performance Summary With
CPW1-3600 CEI Specification Limits
Web Time (see)
Action Time (sec)
MOP Head End (psia)
Max Sea Level Thrust (Mlbf)
Web Time Avg Head End
Pressure (psia)
Web Time Avg Vacuum Thrust (Mlbf)
Web Time Total Impulse (Mlbf-sec)
Action Time Impulse (Mlbf-sec)
I Avg Delivered (Ibf-sec/Ibm)
sp
Ignition Interval (sec),
Time 563.5 psia
Max Pressure Rise Rate
(psi/lO-msec)
Loaded Propellant Weight
of 1,106,190 Ib
Vacuum
Spec Limits Predicted
(60"F)
PV-1
Delivered
(60°F)
106.1 - ]17.2 111.8 111.4
115.4 - 131.4 123.6 122.1
858.7 - 978.1 911.8 908.1
2.87 - 3.25 3.04 3.06
625.8 - 695.8 659.4 664.4
2.45 - 2.72 2.59 2.595
286.] - 291.8 289.1 289.2
293.3 - 299.2 296.8 296.4
265.3 - 269.0 268.6 268.1
0.202 - 0.262 0.232 0.234
X < 115.9 91.8 92.8
w
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the test was a success. Qualitatively, the test shows the motor can tolerate
insulation, capture feature, and wiper O-ring flaws. The V2 pressurization
and temperature in the aft field joint and the VI, V2, and V3 volume pres-
surization and temperature in the nozzle-to-case joint appear reliable.
Post-test insulation and O-ring erosion physical measurements provide a good
source of quantitative data.
3.].12.1 Temperature Data. Temperature data were nominal. Ambient tempera-
ture at the time of ignition was 87"F and PMBT was 79"F.
3.].13 DYnamics
Accelerometers only were used on PV-I to monitor the RSRM dynamic behavior.
Most of the displacement gages and acceierometers were removed due to the
time constraint, leaving only accelerometers A401 through A403. A brief
discussion of these accelerometers is included in this section. Detailed
discussions will be in TWR-17592, Volume IX.
Dynamic-related data from PV-] was used to certify the structural
integrity of the case and to verify finite element models.
3.1.13.1 Results/Discu@sions. Accelerometers A401 through A403 were located
in the forward dome area. The time history plots are presented in Figures
3.1.13.1-I through 3.1.13.1-3, which show that the vibration levels are well
below 2 g during the firing, except a few seconds after ignition.
The power spectrum density for each channel was compared to NASA random
vibration criteria SE-OIg-O49-2H shown in Figures 3.1.13.1-4 through
3.1.13.]-6 for selected time intervals. These figures show that the random
vibration level easily met the criteria. A detailed discussion on the random
vibration and spectrum analysis, emphasizing the cross correlation between
each channel, will be included in TWR-17592, Volume IX.
The auto-spectrum waterfall plots, which were obtained by Fourier-trans-
forming selected intervals of time history data and plotting them in a stack-
ing manner, are shown in Figures 3.1.13.1-7 through 3.1.]3.1-9. The purpose
of waterfall plots is to track the modes of vibration when the excitation
sources are white-type random vibration. Channel A40] is studied briefly
here.
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Channel A40] is measured in the axial direction. Figure 3.1.13.1-7
shows that the third axial mode, which started at about 2] Hz, dominated the
low frequency vibration in the axial direction from after ignition until mid-
burn. The first axial mode ended at about 16 to 17 Hz, which was consistent
with previous motors fired in the T-24 test stand. When approaching the end
of burn, the I-L acoustic mode has great influence on the motor, which can be
seen from the irregular spectrum in the waterfall plots in Figures 3.1.13.1-7
through 3.1.13.1-9.
3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
3.2.1 _laq Prediction
The slag accumulation theory associated with the AP particle size distri-
bution should be further investigated.
3.2.2 Chamber Pressure Oscillation
The magnitude of chamber pressure oscillations should be observed on future
motors.
3.2.3 Nozzle Composite Structure
Fine-tuning nozzle analytical techniques, material properties, and loads
continue to be a priority.
3.2.4 Motor Pressure Measurement (Aft Dome)
Direct measurement of motor pressure in the aft dome region has never been
made and is recommended for the TEM-2 motor.
3.2.5 Nozzle Instrumentation
Continued instrumentation of nozzle components is important to adequately
monitor nozzle response. Development of methods to more directly monitor the
thermostructural response of the phenolic parts should be pursued.
3.2.6 TASS Finite Element Model Results
Differences in measured strain results between coarse- and fine-grid Thiokol
automated stress system (TASS) finite element model (especially in the for-
ward end ring locations 6 and 8 and the aft exit cone region) should be
investigated.
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This section shows PV-1 static test compliance with Specification
CPW1-3600, Addendum D, dated 3 Aug 1987. The following comments are drawn
from the test with a one-to-one correlation to the test objectives listed
in Section 2.
Qualification Objectives
(CEI paragraph number)
A Certify the motor performance
at ambient temperature. (3.2.1)
B Certify the ignition interval.
(3.2.1.1.1.1)
Certify the pressure rise rate.
(3.2.1.1.1.2)
Determine the thrust-time curve
for PV-1 and apply the data to
the nominal thrust-time curve
for certification of the RSRM
design. (3.2.1.1.2.1)
Certify the performance toler-
ances and limits.
(3.2.1.1.2.2)
Determine the impulse attained
by PV-I and apply the data to
the nominal thrust-time curve
for certification of the RSRM
design. (3.2.1.1.2.4)
Certify that all RSRM seals,
except the center and aft field
joints and nozzle-to-case joints,
and igniter-to-case joints but
including adjustable vent port
plug seals in the forward field
joint, experience no erosion by
blowby throughout the static
test, if pressurized. (3.2.1.2)
Pass/Fail Criteria
The motor must meet the perform-
ance requirements of the CEI
specification when PMBT is cal-
culated and performance extrapo-
lated to a +60°F thermal environ-
ment.
The ignition interval (time
to reach head end pressure of
563.5 psia) must be between
0.202 and 0.262 sec after igni-
tion command to the SRM ignition
initiators.
The maximum pressure rise rate
must not exceed 115.9 psi for
any 10 ms time period.
The nominal (arithmetic average)
vacuum thrust versus time curve
(corrected to 60-deg PMBT) for
all appropriate RSRM motors must
fa|l between the upper and lower
bounds of Table I in the redesign
CEI specification.
The individual motor performance
parameters must fall within the
limits specified in Table II of
the redesign CEI specification.
The nominal thrust versus time
curve must comply with the im-
pulse requirements in the re-
design CEI specification.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or blowby detected for the
specified seals (acceptable ero-
sion is allowed on factory joint
insulation acting as the primary
seal).
Results
(Reference Section)
Motor performance was extrapo-
lated to +60°F and all perform-
ance requirements were met.
(Table 3.1.11-i).
The ignition interval was
0.234 sec.
The maximum pressure rise rate
was g2.8 psi/10 ms.
The nominal vacuum thrust-time
curve lies within the values of
Table I of the CEI specification.
Individual motor performance
values are listed in Table
3.1.11-i.
Impulse requirements in the
redesign CEI specification
were met (Table 3.1.11-I).
No evidence of erosion or blow-
by past the RSRM seals.
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H Certify the sealing performance
of the center and aft field
joints and the nozzle-to-case
and igniter-to-case joints.
(3.2.1.2)
I Certify the verifiability of the
RSRM seals (except for the case-
to-nozzle joint primary seal,
the factory joint primary seal,
the fixed housing-to-aft end ring
primary seal, the igniter dual
seal plugs (5 places), and the
OPT primary and secondary seals).
{3.2.1.2)
J Certify that the forward field
joint seals, if pressurized,
accommodate static test motor
structural deflections.
(3.2.1.2.1.a)
K Certify that the center and aft
field joint and the nozzle-to-
case joint accommodate static
test motor structural deflec-
tions. (3.2.1.2.1.a)
L Certify that the forward field
Joint seals, if pressurized,
operate at ambient temperature.
(3.2.1.2.1.b)
M Certify that the center and aft
field joint and nozzle-to-case
joint operate at ambient tem-
perature. (3.2.1.2.1.b).
N Certify that the case field
joint and case-to-nozzle joint
seal verification does not de-
grade the performance or inte-
rity of the sealing system.
3.2.1.2.1.c)
0 Certify that the bore seals for
the forward and center field
joint are verifiable in the
proper direction. (3.2.1.2.1.d)
P Certify that the case-to-nozzle
joint O-ring temperature is main-
tained prior to static firing.
(3.2.1.2.1.f)
Q Certify that the factory Joint
insulation as a seal accomodates
static test motor structural
deflections and erosion.
(3.2.1.2.2.a)
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past the center and aft
field joints or nozzle-to-case
and igniter-to-case joints.
The leak check for these seals
must be successfully completed.
There must be no evidence of
blowby detected past the field
joint seals due to structural
deflections.
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past the center or aft
field joint or nozzle-to-case
joint due to structural deflec-
tions.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or gas leakage past the
field joint seals.
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past the center, aft, or
nozzle-to-case field joint.
There must be no evidence of
damage to insulation, adhesives,
or seals due to leak check
procedures.
The leak check must be success-
fully completed.
Pretest data must show that the
case-to-nozzle joint temperature
was 75°F or higher until time of
motor ignition.
There must be no evidence of hot
gas to the primary or secondary
O-rings due to structural deflec-
tions.
No evidence of gas leakage past
the seals.
Leak check performance of all
Joints was acceptable.
No evidence of blowby detected
due to structural deflections.
No evidence of blowby detected
due to structural deflections.
No evidence of hot gas past the
field joint seals.
No evidence of gas leakage past
the center, aft, or nozzle-to-
case field joint.
No evidence of leak check-
related damage to joint insula-
tion, adhesives, or O-ring seals.
Field Joint leak check per-
formance was acceptable: for-
ward - 3.438 psig, center -
3.140 psig, aft - 4.3 pslg.
Aft skirt conditioning raised
the case-to-nozzle joint tem-
perature to greater than 90°F
at T-O.
Disassembly of factory joints
has not been completed.
Initial inspection indicates
no anomalous conditions.
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Certify that the factory joint
insulation as a seal operates
at ambient temperature.
(3.2.1.2.2.b)
Certify that the insulation per-
forms the seal function for the
factory joint. (3.2.1.2.2.d)
Certify that the factory joint
insulation is adequate to pre-
clude leaks. (3.2.1.2.2.e)
Certify that the flex bearing
accommodates static test motor
structural deflections.
(3.2.1.2.3.a)
Certify that the flex bearing
operates as a seal at ambient
temperature. (3.2.1.2.3.b)
Certify that the flex bearing
seal verification does not de-
grade the performance or inte-
rity of the sealing system.
3.2.1.2.3.c)
Certify that the flex bearing
maintains a positive gas seal
between its internal components.
(3.2.i.2.3.d)
Certify that the ignition seals,
if pressurized, except for the
igniter-to-case joint, accom-
modate static test motor struc-
tural deflections. (3.2.1.2.4.a)
Certify that the ignlter-to-case
joint accommodates static test
motor structural deflection.
(3.2.1.2.4.a)
Certify that the ignition seals,
if pressurized, except for the
igniter-to-case Joint, operate
at ambient temperature.
(3.2.1.2.4.b)
There must be no evidence of hot
gas to the primary or secondary
D-rings.
At least one virgin ply of in-
sulation must remain over the
factory joint with no evidence
of hot gas to the primary or
secondary 0-rings.
There must be no evidence of hot
gas to the primary or secondary
0-rings.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or gas leakage between the
flex bearing internal components
due to structural deflections.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or gas leakage between the
flex bearing internal components.
There must be no evidence of
damage to the flex bearing due
to leak check procedures.
There must be no evidence of
gas leakage between the flex
bearing internal components.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or gas leakage past the
ignition system seals due to
structural deflections.
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past the igniter-to-case
joint.
There must be no evidence of ero-
sion or gas leakage pastthe
ignition system s_als (except
the igniter-to-case joint).
Disassembly of factory joints
has not been completed.
Initial inspection indicates
no anomalous conditions.
Disassembly of factory joints
has not been completed.
Initial inspection indicates
no anomalous conditions.
Disassembly of factory joints
has not been completed.
Initial inspection indicates
no anomalous conditions.
The flex bearing will be fully
inspected and tested during
completion of post-test accept-
ance testing. Visual inspec-
tion indicated no obvious
problems.
The flex bearing will be fully
inspected and tested during
completion of post-test accept-
ance testing. Visual inspec-
tion indicated no obvious
problems.
The flex bearing will be fully
inspected and tested during
completion of post-test accept-
ance testing. Visual inspec-
tion indicated no obvious
problems.
The flex bearing will be fully
inspected and tested during
completion of post-test accept-
ance testing. Visual inspec-
tion indicated no obvious
problems.
Soot was found up to, but not
past, the S&A primary seal on
the aft face. No evidence of
hot gas to the inner or outer
igniter seals.
No evidence of gas leakage past
the igniter-to-case Joint.
There was no evidence of hot
gas to the primary seals and no
evidence of blowby, erosion,
or heat effect. No evidence of
hot gas to the inner, outer,
or S&A seals.
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AB Certify that the ignlter-to-case
joint operates at ambient tem-
perature. (3.2.1.2.4.b)
AC Certify that the ignltion system
seal verification does not de-
grade the performance or inte-
rity of the sealing system.
3.2.1.2.4.c)
AD Certify that the nozzle internal
seals, except for Joint 5, and
the aft exit cone field joint
seals, if pressurized, can
accommodate static test motor
structural deflections.
(3.2.1.2.5.a)
AE Certify that nozzle internal
Jofnt 5 can accommodate static
test motor structural deflec-
tions. (3.2.1.2.5.a)
AF Certify that the nozzle internal
seals, except Joint 5, and the
aft exit cone field joint seals,
if pressurized, operate at
ambient temperature.
(3.2.1.2.5.b)
AG Certify that nozzle internal
Joint 5 operates at ambient tem-
perature. (3.2.1.2.5.b)
AH Certify that the nozzle internal
seals and the aft exit cone field
joint seals verification does not
degrade the performance or inte-
rity of the sealing system.
3.2.1.2.5.c,d)
AI Certify that the bore seals for
the nozzle are verifiable in the
proper direction. (3.2.1.2.5.e)
AJ Certify that the case is capable
of containing the static test
internal pressure. (3.2.1.3.a)
AK Certify that the case ETA risers
do not degrade the integrity of
the case. (3.2.1.3.c)
AL Certify by demonstrating horizon*
tal assembly that the case seg-
ment mating joints have provisions
to ensure proper segment orienta-
tion and alignment. (3.2.1.3.f)
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past the igniter-to-case
joint.
There must be no evidence of
damage to the ignition system
seals due to leak check proced-
ures.
There must be no evidence of
erosion, or gas leakage past the
nozzle internal seals (excluding
Joint 5) or the aft exit cone
Joint seals due to structural
deflections.
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past nozzle Joint 5.
There must be no evidence of
erosion or gas leakage past the
nozzle internal seals, except
Joint 5, or the aft exit cone
joint seals.
There must be no evidence of gas
leakage past nozzle Joint 5.
There must be no evidence of
damage to the nozzle internal
seals or the aft exit cone
field joint seals due to leak
check procedures.
The leak check must be success-
fully completed.
There must be no evidence of
damage to the case due to inter-
nal pressure.
The case must show no evidence
of case damage due to the ETA
risers.
Horizontal assembly with proper
alignment must be demonstrated.
No evidence of gas leakage past
the igniter-to-case joint.
No evidence of leak check-
related damage to ignition
system seals.
No evidence of damage, blowby,
or erosion on the aft exit cone
Joint seals or nozzle internal
seals.
No evidence of gas leakage past
nozzle Joint 5.
No evidence of blowby or ero-
sion on the aft exit cone joint
seals or the nozzle internal
seals.
No evidence of gas leakage past
nozzle Joint 5.
No evidence of leak check-
related damage to nozzle inter-
nal seals or aft exit cone
field joint seals.
Nozzle leak check performance
was acceptable.
No evidence that the case allow-
ed leakage of internal pressures
or local yielding.
No evidence of damage or local
yielding of the case at the ETA
risers.
No GSE was used on PV-I.
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AV
Certify that the nozzle assembly
and exit cone design are compat-
ible with the system performance
requirements. (3.2.1.4, Morton
Thiokol-imposed)
Certify that the nozzle assembly
is capable of vectoring through
the planned duty cycle.
(3.2.1.4.1)
Certify the _eometric nozzle
alignment. (3.2.1.4.2)
Certify the misalignment of the
dynamic thrust vector with re-
spect to the nozzle centerline.
(3.2.1.4.3 and 3.2.1.4.3.a)
Certify the radial offset between
the dynamic thrust vector and the
nozzle centerline. (3.2,1.4.3
and 3.2.1.4.3.b)
Certify the null offset angle at
0 psi nozzle stagnation pressure.
(3.2.1.4.4.a)
Certify the null offset angle at
615 psi nozzle stagnation pres-
sure. (3.2.1.4.4.b)
Certify the null offset angle
at 915 psi nozzle stagnation
pressure, (3.2.1.4.4.c)
Certify the nozzle assembly
TVC actuator attach points.
(3.2.1.4.8)
Certify the nozzle flame front
liner design and fabrication.
(3.2.1.4.13)
The nozzle assembly and exit
cone design must be compatible
with the specified Morton
Thiokol-imposed system perfor-
mance requirements.
The nozzle assembly must follow
the planned duty cycle within
the expected range as determined
by engineering from the histor-
ical performance data base.
With the nozzle and motor center-
lines within 0.5 deg of each
other, the radial offset of the
nozzle centerline at the nozzle
throat plane must not exceed
0.25 in. from the motor center-
line.
Misalignment of the dynamic
thrust vector with respect to
the nozzle centerline must not
deviate more than I deg during
nozzle vectoring between null
and 8 deg.
The radial offset between the
dynamic thrust vector and the
nozzle centerline at the nozzle
throat plane must not exceed
1.13 in. during nozzle vectoring
between null and B deg.
The nozzle null offset angle with
respect to zero actuator command
must not exceed +0.96 deg at
0 psi nozzle stagnation pressure.
The nozzle null offset angle with
respect to zero actuator command
must not exceed ±0.30 deg at
615 psi nozzle stagnation pres-
sure.
The nozzle null offset angle with
respect to zero actuator command
must not exceed -0.50 deg at
915 psi nozzle stagnation pres-
sure.
The nozzle assembly TVC actuator
attach points must be compatible
with the TVC actuators.
There must be no pockets greater
than 0.250 in, deep, no wedge-
outs greater than 0,250 in. deep,
and no prefire anomalies except
as allowed by TWR-16340.
Morton Thiokol-imposed system
performance requirements were
met.
The nozzle assembly followed
the planned duty cycle within
the expected range.
With the nozzle and motor
centerlines within 0.5 deg of
each other, the radial offset
of the nozzle centerline at the
nozzle throat plane was a max-
imum of 0,046 in. from the
motor centerline.
Misalignment of the dynamic
thrust vector with respect to
the nozzle centerline deviated
a maximum of 0.189 deg during
nozzle vectoring.
The radial offset between the
dynamic thrust vector and the
nozzle centerline at the nozzle
throat plane was a maximum of
0,046 in. during nozzle vector-
ing.
The nozzle null offset angle
with respect to zero actuator
command was a maximum of
o.go deg at 0 psi nozzle
stagnation pressure.
The nozzle null offset angle
with respect to zero actuator
command was a maximum of
-0.2 deg at 615 psi nozzle
stagnation pressure.
The nozzle null offset angle
with respect to zero actuator
command was a maximum of
-0.30 deg at 915 psi nozzle
stagnation pressure.
The nozzle assembly TVC actua-
tor attach points were compat-
ible with the TVC actuators.
The nozzle flame front liner
met the requirements of TWR-
16340 and there were no
pockets or wedgeouts occur-
ring during motor operation
observed as a result of
design or fabrication.
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Certify that the ignition system
precludes hot gas leakage during
and subsequent to motor igni-
tion. (3.2.1.5.a)
Certify by demonstration that
the igniter and the S&A are
separable from each other.
(3.2.1.5.b)
Certify the enable function of
the S&A device. (3.2.1.5.I.a)
Certify the S&A change of posi-
tion from safe to arm.
(3.2.1.5.1.d)
Certify that the S&A device will
provide simplex remote position
indication. (3.2.1.5.1.e)
Certify the igniter design.
(3.2.1.5.2)
Certify that the RSRM design
meets the elecromagnetic compat-
ibility requirements.
(3.2.1.6.e)
Certify the operation of the
motor chamber pressure transducer
and its installation.
(3.2.1.6.2.1)
Certify the installation and
function of the ground environ-
mental instrumentation (GEl).
(3.2.1.6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-
proposed SCN 3)
Certify the installation and
operation of the strain gages,
(steel) and (aluminum) in the
nozzle area. (3.2.1.6.2.3,
Morton Thiokol-proposed SCN 3)
Certify the installation and
operation of the girth gages.
(3.2.1.6.2.3, Morton Thiokol-
proposed SCN 3)
There must be no evidence of hot
gas leakage.
Separation of the Igniter and
S&A must be demonstrated.
The S&A device barrier-booster
assembly must provide the energy
flow required to achieve igniter
initiation upon command.
The S&A must change position
From safe to arm.
The S&A device must provide re-
mote indication of position in
both the safe and armed posi-
tions.
There must be no debris formed
which is capable of damaging any
other component which is attrib-
utable to the igniter, and the
igniter must be installed in
only one predetermined rotation-
al position into the igniter
port from the outside of the
forward segment.
The electrical bonding resistance
measurements must not exceed
2.5 milliohms.
The motor chamber pressure pres-
sure transducer must be installed
and function correctly.
The GEl must be installed and
function correctly.
Strain gages must be installed
and function correctly.
Girth gages must be installed
and function correctly.
No evidence of hot gas leakage
past the ignition syttem.
The igniter and S&A are separ-
able from each other.
The S&A device both enabled and
inhibited ignition upon command.
The S&A changed position from
safe to arm upon command.
The S&A device provided remote
indication of position.
No igniter-related debris formed
capable of damaging any other
component. The igniter was in-
stalled in the predetermined
rotational position into the
igniter port from the outside
of the forward segment.
The electrical bonding resis-
tance measurement did not
exceed 2.5 milliohms.
The motor chamber pressure
transducer remained positively
locked and accurately monitored
the motor chamber pressure.
GEl was installed and func-
tioned correctly prior to T-O.
Strain gages were installed and
mandatory data were collected.
Girth gages were installed and
mandatory data were collected.
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BH
BI
BJ
BK
BL
BL-t
BM
BN
BO
BP
BQ
Certify the installation and
operation of the temperature
devices. (3.2.1.6.2.3, Morton
Thiokol-proposed SCN 3)
Certify the installation and
operation of the igniter
chamber pressure transducer.
(3.2.1.6.2.4.a, Addendum G)
Certify the calibration of the
motor chamber pressure
transducer. (3.2.1.6.2.4.b,
Addendum G; ICD 3-44005,
4.3.4)
Certify the forward field joint
insulation temperature
control. (3.2.1.8.1.1.a)
Certify the compatibility of
the leak tests of seals of field
joints, nozzle-to-case joint,
and Igniter-to-case joint with
joints insulations.
(3.2.1.8.1.1 .b)
The insulation shall ensure
that system performance and
structural integrity is
maintained during the
assembly process and
operation. (3.2.1.8.1.1.c)
Certify that the forward field
joint insulation provides seal
protection. (3.2.1.8.1.1.d)
Certify the ability of the
insulation to protect the
forward case joint from
thermal degradation during
an ambient temperature full-
duration motor burn.
(3.2.1.8.1.1.e)
Certify by inspection that the
forward field joint insulation
will withstand slag
accumulation during motor
operation. (3.2.1.8.1.1.g)
Certify that the ballistic
performance is not affected
by the field joint, case-to-
nozzle joint, and igniter-to-
case joint insulation.
(3.2.1.8.1.1.i)
Certify that the igniter
insulation provides adequate
thermal protection for the
main igniter chamber and
adapter metal parts.
(3.2.1.8.3)
Temperature-sensing devices must be
installed and function correctly.
The igniter chamber transducer must
be installed and function correctly.
The electrical output must be 75 +_0.50
percent of the full-scale output.
There must be no damage to the
forward field joint metal structural
integrity or sealing integrity due to
temperature effects.
There must be no damage to the field
joint, nozzle-to-case Joint, or igniter-to-
case joint metal structural integrity or
sealing integrity due to leak check
procedures.
System performance and structural
integrity during the assembly process
and operation shall not be
compromised due to insulation.
There must be no evidence of erosion,
blowby, or hot gas jetting on the
forward field joint primary and
secondary seals.
There must be no thermal degradation
to the forward field joint.
Slag accumulation In joint must not
degrade the case or the sealing
capability of the joint.
There must be no anomaly in the
ballistics trace attributable to the field
Joint and igniter-to-case joint insulation
design.
There must be no damage to the main
igniter chamber or adapter metal parts
due to temperature effects.
Temperature-sensing devices were
Installed and mandatory data were
collected.
The igniter chamber transducer was
installed and data were collected.
The electrical output was 75 percent of
the full-scale output. The motor
chamber pressure transducer was
properly calibrated.
No evidence of damage to the forward
field joint metal structural integrity or
sealing integrity.
No leak check-related damage found
at field joints, nozzle-to-case joint, or
igniter-to-case joint.
The insulation ensured that system
performance and structural integrity
was maintained during the assembly
process and operation. For a
complete Insulation performance
discussion, see TWR-17592, Volume III,
Revision A.
No evidence of thermal damage to the
forward field joint seals.
No evidence of thermal damage to the
forward field joint.
No evidence of measurable slag
damage to joint insulation or case
occurring during motor burn.
Changes in insulation design did not
measurably alter ballistic performance
(Table 3.1.11-1).
No evidence of thermal damage to the
main igniter chamber or adapter metal
parts.
REVISION B ooc.o. TWR-17592 I VOL
SEC I _oE 94
89265-14.1
w_CORPORAPON
1
SPACE OPERATIONS
BR Certify the ability of the field
joint heater assembly to main-
tain the temperature of the field
joints. (3.2.1.11.a)
BS Certify the inert weight by
inspection. (3.2.2.2.1)
BT Certify the propellant weight by
inspection. (3.2.2.2.2)
BU Deleted.
BV Provide data for certification
of the reliability of the RSRM
design. (3.2.3)
BW Certify that the primary struc-
ture, thermal protection, and
pressure vessels meet design
safety factors. (3.2.3.1)
BX
BY
BZ
CA
CB
CC
Certify that the RSRM segments
are capable of horizontal
assembly/disassembly. (3.2.5.1)
Certify that the electrical
bonding meets the requirements
of MIL-B-5087B. (3.3.5.2)
Certify the installation of low
pressure transducer fairings
(nonmetallic) and the triaxial
accelerometer assembly mounting
block (metallic) on the forward
dome. (3.3.6.1.1, MSFC-HDBK-
505A)
Certify the case insulation min-
imum design thermal safety
factor. (3.3.6.1.2.2)
Certify the thermal design
safety factor for the case
insulation adjacent to metal
part field joints and extend-
ing over factory Joints.
(3.3.6.1.2.3)
Certify the case insulation
sandwich construction region
(aft and center segment aft end)
design safet_ factor.
(3.3.6.1.2.4)
The field joint temperature must
be maintained between 75° and
120°F prior to motor ignition.
The inert weight must not exceed
150,847 lb.
The propellant weight must be at
least 1,104,714 lb.
The postfire engineering evalua-
tion limits (TWR-17198) must be
met.
The primary structure, thermal
protection, and pressure vessel
subsystems must preclude motor
failure.
Successful assembly and disassem-
bly in the horizontal position
must be demonstrated.
The pretest electrical bonding
resistance measurements must not
exceed 2.5 milIiohms.
There must be no structural
failure of the fairings or
bondlines.
There must be a minimum case
insulation thermal safety factor
of 1.5 (excluding jeints).
There must be a minimum case
insulation thermal safety factor
of 2.0 for the specified joints.
There must be a minimum safety
factor of 1.5.
Minimum recorded joint heater
sensor temperature was 86°F at
T-O, ensuring 76°F minimum at
the O-rings.
The inert weight was 147,318 lb.
The propellant weight was
1,106,190 lb.
Certification and reliability
data were collected for
evaluation.
The minimum measured primary
structure, thermal protection,
and pressure vessel safety
factor was 3.8 for yield
strength and 4.1 for ultimate
strength, which are well within
the design safety factors of
1.1 for yield strength and
1.4 for ultimate strength.
Horizontal assembly and dis-
assembly was demonstrated.
Pretest bonding requirements
did not exceed 2.5 milliohms.
There were no failures of the
fairings or the bondlines.
Evaluation is not complete, but
will be included in TWR-17592,
Vol. Ill.
Evaluation is not complete, but
will be included in TWR-17592,
Vol. Ill.
Evaluation is not complete, but
will be included in TWR-17592,
Vol. Ill.
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CD Certify the insulation perform-
ance. (3.3.6.1.2.6)
The insulation erosion must not
exceed design safety factors when
corrected using minimum design
thickness.
CE Certify the nozzle design safety
factors. (3.3.6.1.2.7)
The nozzle ablative components
must meet or exceed the design"
safety factors.
CF Certify by demonstration that
the RSRM design minimizes the
need for new on-plant logistics
facilities, and that existing
facilities and facility equipment
are used for the storage of
spares and maintenance functions
to the maximum possible extent.
(3.4.3)
CG Certify that the OBR shows:
i) no evidence of hot gas ero-
sion inside the flex boot cavity
except that produced by the vent-
holes, and 2) OBR hoop continuity
exists through the beginning of
motor pressure to tailoff
--Delamination and wedgeout
of 35-deg wrap acceptable
--Need not comply with CEI
spec 3.2.1.4.13.b dealing
with general wedgeouts
CH Certify the function of the igniter
heater. (3.2.1.5.3, SCN 42)
The PV-I motor must be manufac-
tured and tested using a minimum
of new on-plant logistics facil-
ities.
Success criteria will be met.
Development Objectives
A Acquire engineering data for mode] validation.
B Evaluate the use of the 3-in-] gage for data collection.
C Evaluate nozzle Joint 2 bonding process change.
D Measure joint gap opening in the nozzle internal joints.
Evaluation is not complete, but
will be included in TWR-I7592,
Vol. III.
Evaluation is not complete, but
will be included in TWR-17592,
Vol. VII.
A minimum of new on-plant
logistics facilities were used
to manufacture the PV-I motor.
No evidence of hot gas erosion
inside the flex boot cavity
except that produced by the
ventholes.
OBR hoop continuity was main-
tained through the beginning of
motor pressure to tailoff with
no delaminations or wedgeouts
or 35 deg wrap.
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5
INSTRUMENTATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The PV-I test article included instrumentation similar to that used on pre-
vious static motors and subscale test articles. New instrumentation dis-
cussed below includes 3-in-Is, 2-in-Is, and an Endevco ® pressure transducer
installed to directly measure joint deflection, temperature, and pressure.
Instrumentation was installed on the test article per Drawing 7U76264.
Figures 5.]-I through 5.1-6 show instrument locations. Refer to Appendix B
for instrumentation list and Appendix C for data plots. Additional
instrumentation discussion can be found in TWR-17592, Volume XII.
5.2 OBJECTIVES
PV-I was instrumented to collect the engineering and motor performance data
necessary to evaluate the following objectives from Section 2.
Test Objectives
BD Certify the operation of the motor chamber pressure transducer, P/N
1U50188-07, and its installation with bolt, P/N 1U76488.
BE Certify the installation and function of the ground environment
instrumentation (GEl).
BF Certify the installation and operation of the strain gages, P/N
IU51212-02 (steel) and 1U51212-04 (aluminum) in the nozzle area.
BG Certify the installation and operation of the girth gages.
BH Certify the installation and operation of the temperature devices, P/N
]6A0355-01.
BJ Certify the calibration of the motor chamber pressure transducer.
BI Certify the installation and operation of the igniter chamber pressure
transducer.
BZ Certify the installation of low pressure transducer fairings and
triaxial accelerometer assemblies on the forward segment.
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R537, R538
$885
R527-R534 14.30 in.
True
R519-R526
42-T145
$880
P000024
P000025
R150
R152
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Figure 5.1-4. PV-1 Case-to-Nozzle Joint Instrumentation
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Development Objectives
A Acquire engineering data for joint model validation.
B Evaluate the use of the 3-in-I gages for data collection.
D Measure joint gap opening in nozzle internal joints.
=
u
5.3 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, the instrumentation performed well with only a few exceptions.
Installation was completed successfully and performance in general was as
expected. Valuable performance data were collected. The 3-in-I, 2-in-l, and
Endevco pressure transducers in the joints provided valuable data never
before measured directly on a full-scale static motor.
All instrumentation-related test objectives were met. Pressure trans-
ducer P/N 1U50188-07, was installed with bolt, P/N 1U76488, and performed as
expected. GEl performance was good. Table 5.3-I lists the channels that
were nonrecoverable prior to the test firing. Table 5.3-2 is the Test Area
official anomaly list after the test firing. Temperature devices, P/N
16A03055-1, were also installed with positive results and the motor chamber
pressure transducer was properly calibrated. The unexpected high pressure in
nozzle internal Joint 5 was found to be an error in the calibration ranging
factors.
Breaking torques were as expected on gages installed with EA 934NA
(i.e., 3-in-ls, 2-in-ls, and the Endevco pressure gage).
Additional checks will be made to ensure proper calibration on new
gages. Also, inspections of all gages are conducted to ensure that they are
located and installed properly. There are changes to the disassembly
planning to record breaking torque on gages in joint ports. These changes
will help increase the efficiency of gage performance.
5.4 DISCUSSION
Total motor instrumentation was 346 channels, including pressure, force,
acceleration, displacement, strain, temperature, propellant mean bulk tem-
perature (PMBT), and GEl gages. There were 327 instrumentation channels that
operated correctly.
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Table 5.3-I. Nonrecoverable Channels, Prefire
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Parameter
S000399A
S000439M
S000370H
S001159C
R000304
R000305
S001108
S001142
S001143
D000771
Description
Strainsert
Strain gage
Long wire strain
Long wire strain
Girth gage
Girth gage
Strain gage
Long wire strain
Long wire strain
3-in-I displacement
cause
Broken connection
Electrically open
Damaged at gage
Damaged at gage
Electrically shorted to case
Electrically shorted to case
Electrically shorted case
Electrically open at gage
Electrically open at gage
Damaged coil
Table 5.3-2. Instrumentation Anomalies
w
Parameter Symptom Remark
P-NRO001
T000642
XO00007
P000512
P000506
T000222
T000830
D000773
S001152/
S001153
Saw pressure
No data
Intermittent data
Data after
Data shift
Data lost at
No data
No data
Data shows
Gages switched
Residual pressure in cavity
Open at thermocouple junction
Maintenance problem
Cable connection loose +8 sec
Maintenance problem
Cable connection loose ignition
Ice point not turned on
Bad power supply
Not able to check gages
Out completely
r_
REVISION B _c.o. TWR-17592 Im'
sEc I _oE 105
_- 89265-9.7
_ CORPORATION
w
SPACE OPERATIONS
Post-test inspection of PV-] revealed no missing or loose gages. There
were no missing connections or loose wires. There was no evidence of blowby
past the transducers in the joint ports.
This was the first use on a full-scale motor of 3-in-I, 2-in-I, and
Endevco transducers in the joints. The 3-tn-1 transducers were located one
each in the forward, center, and aft field joint, and case-to-nozzle leak
check ports (Figures 5.4-1 and 5.4-2). The 2-in-I transducers were located
near the flaws in the center, aft field joint, and case-to-nozzle joint vent
ports (Figures 5.4-1 and 5.4-2). Performance was similar to that experienced
on subscale testing and the data collected proved valuable.
An Endevco 8530B-1000 pressure gage was used for the first time by the
flaw in nozzle internal Joint 5 (Figure 5.4-3). This gage recorded a pres-
sure much higher than expected (65.0 psi). It was discovered later that the
calibration factors were in error. The actual pressure was 37 psi.
Table 5.4-1 presents a summary of the instrument types used on PV-1.
The dual seal feature of the 2-in-I gages worked as expected. These gages
were in ports where flaws assured chamber pressure to the gages. Pressure
was recorded at these locations (aft and case-to-nozzle vent ports) with no
sign of leakage past any gage seals. The use of EA 934NA for gage retention
worked very well. There was no evidence of gage backoff due to vibration or
pressure. During gage removal, breaking torques were all in the range of
160-190 in.-lb.
Due to an excess of EA 934NA bonding insulation to the aft exit cone,
the wires for the gages on the aft exit cone interfered with thermal curtain
installation (DR 152097). The discrepancy report (DR) was dispositioned to
shim the gap to protect the wires. In the future, a hole will be provided in
the insulation to bring the wires out aft of the compliance ring.
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Table 5.4-1. Instrumentation Summary
Type of
Instrumentation
Accelerometer
(A)
Extensometers
(D)
Proximity
(D)
Dogbone
(D)
Pressure Transducer
(P)
Nozzle component stress
(S&R)
Girth
(s)
Nozzle/case joint
(s)
Temperature
(T)
Area of
Investiqation
Nozzle and case vibration
Actuator flutter
Nozzle position
Exit cone bondline separation
Field joint movement
Nozzle joint movement
Chamber pressure
Internal dynamic environment
Igniter chamber
Aft field Joint
Center field joint
Fwd field joint
Case-to-nozzle joint
Nozzle internal
Joint 5
Strain Gage
Aft dome/fixed housing stress
Pressure drop in bore
Joint radial growth
Aft exit cone growth
Aft dome/fixed housing movement
Case/nozzle expansion
Case-to-nozzle joint skip/rotation
Strainserts
Bolt loads
External joint temperature
Slag Exit cone temperature
Case-to-nozzle Igniter joint
Field joint heaters
Test Bay
Housekeeping
Number of
Recording
Channels
]2
13
116
15
86
8._/]
Total 346
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PHOTOGRAPHY
Photographic coverage was required to document the test, test configuration,
instrumentation, and anomalous conditions which may have occurred. The PV-I
photographs/video tapes are available from the Thiokol Photo Lab.
6.] STILL PHOTOGRAPHY
Still color photographs of the test configuration were taken before, during,
and after the test. Photographs were taken of joints each 45 deg minimum and
at anomalous conditions. A large number of photographs were taken during
disassembly.
6.2 MOTION PICTURES
Color motion pictures of the test were taken with 4 video, 14 documentary,
16 high-speed cameras, and 4 still sequence cameras to cover the PV-] test
article. Documentary motion pictures are recorded on Roll No. 7656 and high-
speed motion pictures on Roll No. 7657. Photography and video coverage are
listed in Tables 6.2-I and 6.2-2. Camera locations are shown in Figures
6.2-I through 6.2-3.
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Table 6.2-1. Photography and Video Coverage
Camera
1
2
3
4
5
5A
6
6A
6B
7
7B
8
9
10
11
IIA
12
13
13A
13B
14
15
15A
15B
15C
15D
16
16A
16B
17
18
19
19A
19B
2O
Code:
Station
1
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
Location Type Coverage
Gantry HS
Gantry SQ
Gantry Doc
N. Road Doc
N. Wall Doc
N. Wall EHS
N. Wall HS
N. Wall HS
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
8
8
9
9
8
8
8
9
I0
I0
II
II
Ii
ii
N Wall
S Wal l
S Wall
S Wall
N Field
N Field
N Field
N Field
N Field
N Field
N. Field
N. Field
N. Tower
S. Field
S. Field
S. Side
S. Side
S. Field
S. Field
S. Field
S. Side
S. Tower
S. Tower
T-Block
T-Block
T-Block
Bay Floor
EHS
Doc
Doc
HS
HS
Doc
HS
HS
HS
Doc
Doc
SQ
Doc
HS
HS
HS
HS
HS
Doc
Vid
Doc
HS
Doc
Doc
Vid
SQ
Doc
EHS - High speed at 1,000 pps
HS - High speed at 300 pps
Doc - Documentary at 24 pps
SQ - Sequence at I pps
Vid - Video at real time
Ir - Infrared
Motor and plume
Motor and plume
Motor and plume
Motor and plume
North side motor joints and plume
Center field joint at 135 deg
Center fwd joint
Center and aft field joints at
135 deg
Aft field joint at 135 deg
South side motor joints and plume
Aft case deluge system
Center joint
North side aft joint and plume
Aft joint - nozzle and plume
Nozzle and thermal curtain
Nozzle and 200 ft of plume
North side - all joints
Motor and plume
NASA documentary
Motor and plume
North side of motor and plume
Aft joint
Aft case nozzle and plume
All joints
Nozzle and thermal curtain
Nozzle and 200 ft of plume
Aft case, nozzle and plume
Aft case, nozzle and plume
Overall of motor/NASA documentary
Case nozzle and plume
Case nozzle and plume
Motor and plume
Motor and plume
Motor and plume
Bottom of case
r_
REVISION
89265-13.4
ooc_ TWR-17592 I_
sEc I .aE 1 12
w= -
m
T_ CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
Table 6.2-2. Photography and Video Coverage
Camera
1
2
3
4
5
5A
6
6A
6B
7
7A
8
9
10
II
11A
12
13
13A
13B
14
15
15A
15B
15C
15D
15E
16
16A
16B
17
18
19
19A
19B
2O
Mandatory (M) or
Start Time Stop Time Required (R)
Station (sec_ (sec) Priority
I T-5 T+150 M
1 T-2 T+150 R
1 T-15 T+180 R
2 T-15 T+180 R
3 T-15 T+180 R
3 T-2 T+20 M
3 T-5 T+150 M
3 T-5 T+150 M
3 T-2 T+20 M
4 T-15 T+180 R
4 T-15 T+33 min M
4 T-5 T+150 M
5 T-5 T+150 M
5 T-15 T+555 M
6 T-5 T+150 M
6 T-5 T+150 M
6 T-5 T+150 M
6 T-25 T+180 R
6 T-25 T+180 R
6 T-2 T+180 R
7 T-25 T+180 R
8 T-5 T+150 M
8 T-5 T+150 M
9 T-5 T+150 M
9 T-5 T+150 M
9 T-5 T+150
8 T-5 T+150
8 T-15 T+600 R
8 T-15 T+600 R
9 T-15 T+600 R
10 T-5 T+150 M
10 T-15 T+180 R
11 T-15 T+180 R
11 T-15 T+180 M
11 T-25 T+180
11 T-15 T+150 M
Station Location Station Location
Top of gantry crane
Northwest of bay
North of bay
South wall
North of nozzle
North and aft of nozzle
7
8
9
I0
II
North tower
South of nozzle
South and aft of nozzle
South tower
Top of thrust block
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t
\
\ (HS) I
\ 16All
\
\ (HS) I
\
\
\
(HS) I
\\I5AII
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Figure 6.2-1. Photography
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Code
Doc - Documentary
HS - High Speed
SQ - Sequence
Coverage
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(Sta 6) (Doc)
North Side
(SQ)
(Doc)
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w
(HS)
(Doc) / /
(HS)
D
(Sta 5)
North Field
/
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/
/
(HS)
(Sta 8)
South Field
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Bay Floor
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CP
T-Block
(Sta 11)
Figure 6.2-2.
Code
Doc - Documentaw
HS - High Speed
SQ - Sequence
A1872ga
Photography Coverage
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Figure 8.2-3.
Doc - Documentary
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GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
All GSE used on PV-I will be discussed in the applicable component volume of
TWR-17592.
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LOADS AND ENVIRONMENT
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This section is concerned with case line loads and actuator bracket stresses
experienced during the PV-I static test. The maximum case tangential and
axial line loads were determined as well as the stresses involved with the
TVC nozzle actuator bracket.
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8.2 OBJECTIVES
The main test objective from Section 2 with regard to loads and environments
is:
BV Certify the reliability of the RSRM design.
While this report does not attempt to certify RSRM reliability, it does
provide useful input to that task.
8.3 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The axial line loads that were calculated were well within the design limits
stated in CEI specification paragraph 3.2.7.2.2. The nozzle actuator bracket
was also analyzed and the stresses induced by the TVC were far below the
yield stress for the bracket material.
The line loads due to hoop stress were calculated and can be used for
comparison on future tests and flights. The overall case line load envelope
could be evaluated if more case strain instrumentation were installed on
future tests.
8.4 RESULTS/DISCUSSIONS
The highest tangential line load, i.e., the line load due to the hoop stress,
was -43.38 kips/in. (Figure 8.4-I). Since there are no tangential line loads
calculated for the RSRM, the values obtained from the pVo] test can be used
for comparison of tangential line loads on future tests and flights. The
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highest axial line load obtained during the static test was -21.69 kips/inch.
(Figure 8.4-2) at Station 1175.0 (Figure 8.4-3). This value is much lower
than the -37.5 kips/in, obtained during the lift-off phase at the same
station.
Since there was no instrumentation to measure the axial strain directly,
Hooke's Law o = E*(, (where ( is the strain in _/in., E is the modulus of
elasticity of the material in psi, and a is the stress in psi) was used to
convert the strain into stress. The relation aaxia I = ½Ohoop was then used
to determine the axial stress. The case line load was calculated by multi-
plying the case stress by the local case thickness.
The axial line loads are negative because of the booster coordinate
system sign convention. A positive force is a compressive force in the X
direction (Figure 8.4-4). A positive axial stress would signify tension,
therefore yielding a negative force. The tangential line loads follow the
same convention: a positive stress results in a negative force.
The nozzle actuator bracket was instrumented with two biaxial strain
gages to measure the stress transmitted to the bracket during the TVC cycle
(Figure 8.4-5). The maximum stress obtained was at the inboard gage location
in the axial direction. The stress on the bracket was 11 ksi (Figure 8.4-6),
which is much lower than the 43 ksi yield stress of the bracket material.
The stress measured at the outboard gage was low and not of significance
(Figure 8.4-7).
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APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The latest revisions of the following documents, unless otherwise specified,
are applicable to this report.
Specification
CPWI-3600, Addendum D
CTP-O055
TWR-15723
TWR-16340
TWR-16416
TWR-16473, Vol. I-IX
TWR-17198, Vol. I-IX
TWR-17592, Vol. II
TWR-17592, Vol. Ill
TWR-17592, Vol. IV
TWR-17592, Vol. V
TWR-17592, Vol. Vl
TWR-17592, Vol. VII
TWR-17592, Vol. IX
TWR-17592, Vol. X
TWR-17592, Vol. XI
Prime Equipment Contract End Item Detail
Specification (CEI)
Space Shuttle Process Verification Motor (PV-I)
Static Fire Test Plan
Development and Verification of Nozzle Assembly
NonDestructive Radiographic Criteria for the Space
Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Nozzle Phenolics
Pressurization of the Aft End Ring to the Fixed
Housing Joint of PVM-I
Motor Postfire Engineering Evaluation Plan
Postfire Engineering Evaluation Limits
Case Component Final Report
Case Internal Insulation Component Final Report
Seals Component/Leak Check Final Report
Nozzle/Flex Bearing/Composite Structures/TVC Final
Report
Ignition System Component Final Report
Joint Protection System/Factory Joint Weather Seal
Final Report
Dynamics Final Report
Aero/Thermal Final Report
Ballistics Final Report
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